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Over the past decade, incumbent Philippine President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo has been besieged by accusations of corrup-
tion, bribery, and influence-peddling in the approval and alloca-
tion of foreign-financed public contracts. The latest scandal
directly implicating the President involved a proposed National
Broadband Network (NBN) to be undertaken by a Chinese con-
tractor, ZTE Corporation, under a foreign loan financing agree-
ment with the Chinese government. During Senate investigations
of the NBN contracts, then-Secretary of the National Economic
Development Authority (NEDA) Romulo L. Neri disclosed that
he was offered a 200 million Philippine peso (Php) bribe to favor-
ably endorse the contract. A subsequent NEDA whistleblower
was later abducted by government authorities, apparently to pre-
vent him from testifying on multimillion dollar kickbacks de-
manded for the NBN project, and how NEDA had been reduced
to a rubber-stamp in the evaluation and approval process. On the
heels of public riots, impeachment threats, and the near-toppling
of the Arroyo government, the President declared the cancellation
of the NBN contract in October 2007.
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This paper examines the Presidential use of "administrative
authority" within the process of approving, policing, and monitor-
ing of foreign-financed contracts, specifically in the form of
projects financed through Official Development Assistance
(ODA) or through "tied loans" that require selection of the project
contractor from the donor country. Analysis of Philippine admin-
istrative law and jurisprudence reveals that the President's
broadly-construed authority to conduct administrative reorganiza-
tions grants her virtually full control of the ODA approval, evalua-
tion, and monitoring process and seriously undermines the
functional independence of NEDA (and its Investment Coordina-
tion Committee). This is contrary to the legislative intent of ensur-
ing inter-agency checks and proper project vetting under the
Official Development Assistance Act of 1996.
To date, however, the Philippine Supreme Court has set a rel-
atively low threshold of "good faith and administrative efficiency"
for affirmation of the validity of administrative reorganizations.
The Court has exhibited an almost-automatic deference to the
President's assertion of "good faith and administrative efficiency
purposes." In light of important constitutional policies that regu-
late foreign loan contracting, this paper proposes that the Court
reconsider its minimal test for the validity of administrative reorga-
nizations, particularly when they occur against the sensitive con-
text of ODA project approvals and allocations. When the
President's administrative fiat is apparently deployed to circum-
vent legislative standards and constitutionally-mandated indepen-
dent agency oversight, the Court should exercise its expanded
power of judicial review under the 1987 Philippine Constitution to
impose higher scrutiny on the President's exercise of power to re-
organize the Executive Branch.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2000, the Philippines has received relatively increasing
levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA), or develop-
ment aid loans, from donor countries as well as international fi-
nancial institutions.' As of the end of 2008, total Philippine
1. See NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, 16TH (2007)
ANNUAL ODA PORTFOLIO REVIEw, http://www.neda.gov.ph/progs-prj/16thODA/
16thodamain.htm (last visited October 18, 2009).
The CY 2007 ODA Loans Portfolio amounted to US$9.747 billion cov-
ering 130 loans composed of 119 project and 11 program loans. Sev-
enty-eight percent or US$7.576 billion of the portfolio is accounted for
by project loans while the remaining 22 percent or US$2.171 billion by
program loans (Annex 2-A). Of the 130 loans in 2007, 103 are ongo-
ing (including 9 newly effective loans), 5 are newly-signed and 22 loans
closed within the year. The amount of ODA loans has been decreas-
ing since 2000 and only slightly increased by 3 percent in CY 2007,
from the US$9.477 billion CY 2006 figure. Starting CY 2005, there
was a noted increase in program loans, consistent with the country's
commitment to the program-based approach espoused by the Paris
Declaration. The concessionality of ODA loans is measured by their
grant element which is the reduction enjoyed by the borrower when
debt service payments (principal and interest) expressed at their pre-
sent values discounted at 10 percent are less than the face value of the
loans or loan and grant Per the ODA Act, the weighted average grant
element of all ODA at anytime shall not be less than 40 percent and
each ODA must contain a grant element of at least 25 percent. Per
DOF computation, the grant element of all ODA loans, from effectiv-
ity of the ODA Act in 1996 to December 2007, is 53.31 percent (An-
nex 2-B). For the past years, the Infrastructure Sector has consistently
been the recipient of the largest share of the ODA loans portfolio. In
CY 2007, 57 percent or US$5.532 billion was the sector's share, broken
down as follows: (i) Transportation with 35 loans amounting to US$
3.833 billion or 39 percent of the portfolio; (ii) Energy, Power and
Electrification with five loans worth US$852 million (9 percent); iii)
Water Resources with 16 loans involving US$695 million (7 percent);
and, (iv) Social Infrastructure with five loans amounting to US$152
million (2 percent) (Annex 2-C). The Agriculture, Agrarian Reform
and Natural Resources Sector cam second, with 20 loans worth
US$1.672 billion (17 percent). Meanwhile, the Social Reform and De-
velopment Sector is the third largest recipient which accounts for 12
percent of the portfolio or US$1.153 billion involving 24 loans. This is
followed by the Industry, Trade and Tourism Sector which received a
seven percent share of the portfolio with nine loans worth US$706 mil-
lion, and the Governance and Institution Development Sector which
accounts for the remaining seven percent of the portfolio or US$683
million for six loans. Notable improvements in the CY 2007 distribu-
tion is the significant increase in the ODA share of the Governance
and Institutions Development Sector which received US$683 million
(7 percent of the portfolio) in 2007 from only US$22 million in CY
2006 (0.2 percent). Four new governance projects implemented by the
Department of Finance (DOF), Bureau of Customs (BOC) and Bu-
reau of Internal Revenue (BIR) became effective in CY 2007. The
Government of Japan through the Japan Bank for International Coop-
eration (GOJ-JBIC) is still the biggest source of ODA loans account-
ing for 37 percent or US$3.646 billion with 46 loans. This is followed
by other sources (Austria, Belgium, China, Germany, International
Fund for Agricultural Development [IAFD], Korea, Kuwait, Nordic
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foreign debt stood at US$87 billion, over thirteen percent higher
than at the end of 2007. Foreign debt accounts for 43% of total
government debt. In January 2009, the Philippines issued the
first global bonds in Asia for the year, raising US$1.5 billion from
an offer of ten-year bonds.2 As of this writing, the Philippines is
ranked 47th out of 203 countries with respect to the total volume
of external debt.3
Economists and fiscal experts have raised serious concerns
about the surge of ODAs to the Philippines, reminiscent of the
cheap credits frequently used by the 1970s Marcos dictatorship
that predicated the expansion of the national debt. According to
these experts, the growing supply of ODAs from China has led to
Philippine government agencies relaxing their supervision of pro-
ject evaluation.4 As a consequence, Chinese ODA loans end up
being allocated to "projects of doubtful social or economic
value."s
A recent example of such dubious ODA-financed projects
involved the 2007 contracts for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) and Cyber-Education Project.6 Varying allegations of
Development Fund [NDF], Netherlands, Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries [OPEC], Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Spain, and
United Kingdom) which funded 35 loans worth US$2.282 billion or 23
percent of the portfolio. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) had a
share of 20 percent (or US$1.980 billion with 23 loans) while the
World Bank accounted for 19 percent (or US$1.838 billion with 26
loans) of the portfolio.
2. See Rosemarie Francisco, Philippine government debt at end-2008 falls
slightly, REUTERS, March 12, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAnd
Markets/idINMAN5414220090312 (last visited October 18, 2009).
3. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/rank/html?countryName=Philippines&countryCode=ph&region
Code=as&rank=47#ph (last visited October 18, 2009).
4. Efren L. Danao, Clip Palace's power on loans - Mar, THE MANILA TIMES,
October 16, 2007, http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/oct/16/yehey/
top-stories/20071016top3.html (last visited 10 March 2009).
5. Roel R. Landingin, ODA surge sparks scandals for Arroyo, debt woes for
RP, SUN STAR, February 12, 2008, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/net/2008/02/12/
oda.surge.sparks.scandals.for.arroyo.debt.woes.for.rp.html (last visited October 18,
2009).
6. See DEP'T OF TRANSP. & COMMC'NS, CONTRACT FOR THE SUPPLY OF
EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES FOR THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK PROJECT
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS AND ZTE CORPORATION (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.inquirer.net/specialfeatures/nbndeal. The Philippine government,
through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a 21
April 2007 Supply Contract (hereafter, "ZTE Supply Contract") with a Chinese con-
tractor, ZTE Corporation for the establishment of the NBN. The ZTE Supply Con-
tract specified three (3) other agreements: 1) a July 12, 2006 Memorandum of
Understanding between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
ZTE International Investment Limited, "in respect of the Nationwide Government
Broadband Communication Infrastructure Project"; 2) an Executive Agreement be-
tween the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China "where
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massive corruption and contractual illegality prompted three
committees of the Philippine Senate (the Committee on Ac-
countability of Public Officers and Investigations, the Committee
on Trade and Commerce, and the Committee on National De-
fense and Security) to conduct a joint investigation of the circum-
stances surrounding the execution and financing of the NBN and
Cyber-Education contracts. When then-National Economic De-
velopment Authority (NEDA) Secretary Romulo L. Neri was
called upon to testify, he disclosed that the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections had offered him a bribe to favorably
endorse the NBN contract. Neri also stated that he had informed
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribe offer. The
disclosure prompted Senators to ask whether President Arroyo
followed up the NBN project with Neri, whether President Ar-
royo directed Neri to prioritize it, and whether President Arroyo
directed Neri to approve the project. Neri responded to each
question with a claim of executive privilege.7
After the abduction of a NEDA whistleblower who was in-
structed to "moderate the greed" of corrupt intermediaries"
sparked public protests and political turmoil, President Arroyo
abruptly cancelled the NBN contracts.9 The controversy over the
NBN contracts illustrates the weaknesses of agency oversight and
administration in the evaluation, approval, and allocation process
for ODAs. NEDA is constitutionally-mandated as the "indepen-
dent planning agency of the government"10 and has a critical role
the latter agreed to finance the National Broadband Network Project"; and 3) a
Loan Agreement with Export-Import Bank of China "subject to the condition that
the Equipment and Services to be procured from the proceeds of the loan come
from ZTE Corporation." None of these agreements, apart from the ZTE Supply
Contract, is available to the Senate or the rest of the public.
7. The Philippine Supreme Court, voting 9 to 6, held that Neri was entitled to
the claim of executive privilege. See Romulo L. Neri v. Senate Committee on Ac-
countability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and
Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No.
180643, March 25, 2008 and September 4, 2008 (denial of reconsideration). See Di-
ane A. Desierto, "Universalist Constitutionalism in the Philippines: Restricting Ex-
ecutive Particularism in the Form of Executive Privilege", Journal of Law and
Politics in Africa, Asia, and Latin America/Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee (2009).
8. See Veronica Uy, "Senate to include Lozada abduction in NBN probe Fri-
day", February 7, 2008, Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/break-
ingnews/nation/view/20080207-117366/UPDATE-NBN-hearing-set-Friday-says-
Cayetano (last visited 10 February 2009).
9. See Michael Lim Ubac, "Arroyo decides 'not to continue' with the ZTE
deal -- Bunye", October 2, 2007, Philippine Daily Inquirer, full text of article availa-
ble at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/topstories/topstories/view/20071002-92067/Ar-
royo-decides %27not to continue%27 withZTEzdeal-Bunye (last visited 10
February 2009).
10. See CONsT. (1987), Art. XII, § 9:
"The Congress may establish an independent economic and plan-
ning agency headed by the President, which shall, after consultations
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in project evaluation and recommending ODA approval to the
President. However, in recent years, the President has wielded
her administrative authority to bypass NEDA's strict processes
and enabled agencies to approve foreign-financed projects
outside of NEDA standards."
with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local
government units, recommend to Congress, and implement continuing
integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national devel-
opment. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Eco-
nomic and Development Authority shall function as the independent
planning agency of the government."
11. See Roel R. Landingin, ODA surge sparks scandals for Arroyo, debt woes
for RP, PHIL. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, Feb. 11, 2008, http://
www.pcij.org/stories/2008/oda3.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (emphasis added):
From evaluating government projects to "moderating greed," the
role of NEDA and the economic planning secretary has evolved in
ways that may shock its former officials. Among them is Ruperto
Alonzo, a former NEDA deputy director-general, who says that until
the 1990s, NEDA staff refused to entertain phone calls from officials
of implementing agencies, instructing them instead to communicate in
writing. He himself was "hiding every so often from consultants of
implementing agencies."
The transformation in NEDA's role was not sudden. Long before
the NBN project, the Arroyo administration had been moving to give
implementing agencies more power to approve big state projects, with-
out going through the strict but often time-consuming evaluation pro-
cess of NEDA and its Investment Coordinating Committee (ICC).
Early last year, Arroyo proposed new BOT law implementing rules
that would diminish NEDA-ICC's powers in approving infrastructure
projects funded and implemented by the private sector. Under these
rules, which ostensibly aim to hasten the BOT evaluation process, im-
plementing agencies such as government departments, state-owned
firms, and local government units would have the authority to approve
the projects.
The new BOT rules followed previous moves by Arroyo "to au-
thorize agencies to approve contracts (worth) less than Php 500 mil-
lion, except BOT, without going through the NEDA-ICC process, as
long as the DBM (Department of Budget and Management) can cer-
tify the availability of funds," according to a March 2005 ICC policy
directive. Malacafiang has put off issuing the new BOT rules after
multilateral lenders and the foreign chambers of commerce objected
to clipping the powers of the NEDA-ICC. But the erosion of NEDA's
powers and independence continues, with the creation of new Cabinet
groupings with powers that overstep those of existing NEDA bodies. In
May 2007, Arroyo issued an administrative order creating the so-
called NEDA Cabinet Group that makes major economic decisions,
including the approval of proposed projects, in between the monthly
meetings of the NEDA Board. She also set up the Pro-Performance
System Steering Committee that would monitor and evaluate "all in-
creases in project cost, whether local or foreign funded." Until then, it
was the NEDA-ICC that approved cost increases in foreign-assisted
projects, without which the Department of Budget and Management
could not release additional funding.
Tough standards for project approval are being relaxed. In a
memorandum issued after the October 9 meeting of the NEDA
Cabinet group, Cabinet Secretary Ricardo Saludo told NEDA to
review the 15-percent minimum economic internal rate of return
(EIRR) required for ICC approval of proposed projects "with the
[Vol. 27:7176
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The President's erosion of NEDA's functional independence
through administrative "reorganizations" or the creation of ad
hoc administrative groupings that supersede NEDA's oversight
powers has been accepted as a valid exercise of her administra-
tive authority in the process of ODA approval and allocation.
Whether or not this erosion is legal, however, depends on how
one construes the actual breadth of the President's administra-
tive authority under the 1987 Constitution, the Philippine Ad-
ministrative Code of 1987, and other relevant laws.
This paper argues that the scope of the President's adminis-
trative authority in the particular context of ODAs or foreign de-
velopment loans should be reassessed. Part I (The Philippine
Administrative Framework and the ODA Process) describes the
President's administrative authority within the Philippine consti-
tutional and statutory framework, and places Presidential author-
ity in the position contemplated by the Official Development
Assistance Act of 1996. Part I also explains the constitutional
role of NEDA, and shows how this role animates NEDA's over-
sight mandate with respect to foreign loan evaluations and
approvals.
Part II (Administrative Reorganization: Comparative Prac-
tices) then juxtaposes Presidential power to reorganize adminis-
trative agencies as interpreted by the Philippine Supreme Court
against the comparative origins of such authority in the United
States. As will be shown in Part II, administrative reorganization
is not inherently or purely an executive function. Rather, the
President's authority to reorganize the Executive Branch has fre-
quently been wielded pursuant to legislative delegation. Gener-
ally, the scope of oversight of the Executive is directly
proportional to the extent of after the fact agenda control and
access to information retained by the Legislature.12 This diffu-
sion of authority to conduct administrative reorganizations does
end in view of reducing it." Alonzo, who notes that other admin-
istrations also had ad hoc economic policy groups, nonetheless
warns they create opportunities for "forum shopping" for officials
and agencies pushing for projects that do not pass muster with the
ICC or NEDA staff. The erosion of NEDA's power and indepen-
dence diminishes the gains made by the agency in recent years to
improve the project evaluation system.
See also Lala Rimando, New BOT Rules Undermine NEDA, Nov. 30 2007, NEWS-
BREAK, available at http://www.newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com con-
tent&task=view&id=3973&Itemid=88889053; Cai U. Ordinario, Strengthen NEDA
through reforms, urge former chiefs, Oct. 8, 2007, BusINESS MIRROR, available at
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/10082007/economy01.html.
12. See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Infor-
mation, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POLITICAL Sci. 703-09 (1994), reprinted in
THE EcoNoMics OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 35-41 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2007).
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not threaten the concept of a unitary executive. 13 As American
jurisprudential practice affirms, the Legislature can specifically
delegate regulatory decision-making to independent agencies,
whose decisions may not be pre-empted or substituted for by the
President as head of the Executive Branch. 14 Moreover, the
American Constitution significantly influenced early textual for-
mulations of executive power in the constitution of its former
colony, the Philippines. Due to this transmission, the Philippine
Supreme Court has, at times, given persuasive weight to compar-
ative interpretations seen from American jurisprudential
practices.' 5
A comparative review of US jurisprudential practice also
demonstrates that the President's barefaced assertion of "admin-
istrative efficiency and economy" does not by itself justify admin-
istrative reorganizations. This relevant comparative practice
should be taken into account in examining trends in the Philip-
pine Supreme Court's adjudicatory and evidentiary policies in
administrative reorganization cases. In these cases, the Court al-
most automatically defers to the President's stated justification of
"administrative efficiency and economy." Petitioners question-
ing the administrative reorganization assume the burden of prov-
ing "bad faith" based on the policies set by the Court in Larin v.
Executive Secretary and Dario v. Mison.16 These cases do not
show that the President cannot be compelled to assume a coun-
terpart burden of proof to show that administrative reorganiza-
tions are conducted in good faith.
13. See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State:
the Not-so-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 973-76 (2001).
14. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-97 (1988); U.S. ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S.
139 (1937); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534
(9th Cir. 1993).
15. See Diane A. Desierto, "A Universalist History of the 1987 Philippine Con-
stitution (I)", Historia Constitucional (Electronic Journal of Constitutional History),
vol. 10 (2009), pp. 389-44, at 431-433, available at http://www.seminariomar-
tinezmarina.com/ojs/index.php/historiaconstitucional/article/view/236/209 (last vis-
ited Dec. 2, 2009).
See also Milagros Santos-Ong, "Philippine Legal Research", at http://
www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/philippines.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009):
"Persuasive mandatory authority is law created by other jurisdictions
but which have persuasive value to our courts e.g. Spanish and Ameri-
can laws and jurisprudence. These sources as used specially when
there are no Philippine authorities available or when the Philippine
statute or jurisprudence under interpretation is based on either the
Spanish or American law."
16. Larin v. Exececutive Sec'y, G.R. No. 112745, (October 16, 1997), available
at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/; Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, (August 8, 1989). http:/
/www.lawphil.net/.
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Finally, Part III (Delimitations to the President's Adminis-
trative Authority in the ODA Process) rounds out the argument
that the President's administrative authority in the ODA ap-
proval, evaluation, and allocation process is circumscribed by ex-
press constitutional considerations made for the role of NEDA,
the Monetary Board, and Legislative oversight. Not only does
the 1987 Constitution deliberately eschew a strong model of the
unitary executive, but the authority of other independent agen-
cies such as NEDA and the Monetary Board was expressly pro-
vided for in the constitutional text precisely to avoid a repeat of
the Presidential abuses in foreign loan contracting that occurred
under the Marcos dictatorship. Higher constitutional considera-
tions militate against a broad construction of administrative reor-
ganization powers when they undermine the constitutional
independence of other agencies. Thus the President infringes
critical constitutional policies in the ODA process when she: 1)
"reorganizes" executive agencies that appropriate NEDA's role
in project evaluation, ODA assessment, and approval; 2) by-
passes the required prior Monetary Board concurrence for ob-
taining foreign loans; 3) denies public access to information on
foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the government; and 4)
altogether subverts the required Legislative approval by entering
into "executive agreements" with ODA donor countries.
When administrative reorganization powers are invoked
within an ODA process context, the judiciary should be vigilant
in assessing the genuineness of the assertion. Naked claims of
"administrative efficiency and purpose," without proof that the
reorganization does not intend nor effect the violation of consti-
tutional policies in foreign loan contracting, should not direct the
Philippine Supreme Court. The 1987 Constitution purposely
vests the Court with expanded powers of judicial review and
rule-making, precisely to safeguard against these kinds of ex-
cesses of executive power.
II. THE PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
AND THE ODA PROCESS
The canonical bases for the President's administrative au-
thority are found in two provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Ar-
ticle VII, Section 1 states that "[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines," while Article VII,
Section 17 provides that "[t]he President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed."17 The President's encom-
17. CONST. (1987), Art. VII, H§ 1, 17.
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passing administrative power flows from these broad constitu-
tional grants of authority:
As head of the Executive Department, the President is
the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a
whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his department. He has control over the ex-
ecutive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he
has the authority to assume directly the functions of the execu-
tive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discre-
tion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of
laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and of-
fices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of apply-
ing policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper gov-
ernmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.18
The Administrative Code of 1987 likewise reflects the un-
derlying constitutional bases for the President's general adminis-
trative authority. 19 It provides an enumeration of the President's
administrative powers: 1) the Ordinance Power (e.g., the Presi-
dent may issue administrative orders, proclamations, memoran-
dum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special
18. Blas F. Ople v. Ruben D. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 (en
banc) (emphases added).
19. Id. at note 17: The Administrative Code is a:
general law and incorporates in a unified document the major struc-
tural, functional and procedural principles of governance and embod-
ies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to
serve the people. The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I
deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the
Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III
on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch,
Book V on the Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National
Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure
... These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial
branches of government, the organization and administration of de-
partments, bureaus and offices under the Executive Branch, the organ-
ization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as
well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the inter-
nal administration of government, i.e., internal organization, personnel
and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the
functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals
or parties outside government.
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orders20); 2) Power over Aliens (e.g. deportation, change of non-
immigrant status to permanent residency, power to countermand
decisions of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immi-
gration, and power over aliens as are recognized under generally
accepted principles of international law 21); 3) Powers of Eminent
Domain, Escheat, Land Reservation and Recovery of Ill-gotten
Wealth; 22 4) Power of Appointment (e.g., appointment and tem-
porary designation 23); and 5) Power over Local Governments. 24
Apart from the enumeration the Code recognizes the Presi-
dent's other "constitutional" and "residual" powers. 25 The Code
specifically grants continuing authority to the President to reor-
ganize administrative structure:
20. Id. at note 18, Book III, Chapter 2, Sections 2-7:
"SECTION 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President pro-
viding for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation
or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promul-
gated in executive orders.
SECTION 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursu-
ance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in ad-
ministrative orders.
SECTION 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a
date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regula-
tion is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which
shall have the force of an executive order.
SECTION 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on
matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary inter-
est which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government
shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
SECTION 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President
on matters relating to internal administration, which the President
desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or
compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
SECTION 7. General or Special Orders. - Acts and commands
of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders."
21. Id. at note 18, Book IlI, Chapter 3, Sections 8-11.
22. Id. at note 18, Book III, Chapter 4, Sections 12-15.
23. Id. at note 18, Book III, Chapter 5, Sections 16-17.
24. Id. at note 18, Book III, Chapter 6, Section 18. This power has been sub-
stantially modified under the Local Government Code of 1991. See Republic Act
No. 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991).
25. Id. at note 18, Book III, Chapter 7, Sections 19-20:
"SECTION 19. Powers Under the Constitution. - The Presi-
dent shall exercise such other powers as are provided for in the
Constitution.
SECTION 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and func-
tions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws
and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not del-
egated by the President in accordance with law."
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SECTION 31. Continuing Authority of the President to
Reorganize his Office. - The President, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to re-
organize the administrative structure of the Office of the Pres-
ident. For this purpose, he may take any of the following
actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Com-
mon Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the Presi-
dent to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other Depart-
ments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President
to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies
to the Office of the President from other departments or
agencies. 26
The Philippine Supreme Court has broadly construed the
President's continuing authority to reorganize the National Gov-
ernment. The latest statement of this broad construction can be
found in Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Phil-
ippines, Inc. (MEWAP) et al. v. Honorable Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo et al.2 7 Writing on behalf of the Court, Chief
Justice Reynato Puno explicitly defined reorganization as the
"reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions,"
which "alters the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibil-
ity between them." According to the Court:
[A]s far as bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President's power of control
may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular of-
fice, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures. The President's power to
reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No.
292 which grants the President broad organization powers to
implement reorganization measures.
These residual powers are "too broad to be construed as
having a sole application to the Office of the President," and that
26. Id. at note 18, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31.
27. Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(MEWAP) et al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo et al., G.R.
No. 160093, July 31, 2007.
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"[i]n fact.. .the President's power to reorganize the executive de-
partment even finds further basis under Sections 78 and 80 of
R.A. No. 8522."28 The only limit set by the Court to the Presi-
dent's broad authority to reorganize is the test of good faith:
Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in
carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the
executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith
if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. R.A. No. 6656 provides for the circumstances
which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the re-
moval of civil service employees made as a result of reorgani-
zation, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the depart-
ment or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished
and another performing substantially the same functions is
created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less quali-
fied in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
(d) where there is a classification of offices in the department
or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform sub-
stantially the same functions as the original offices; and (e)
where the removal violates the order of separation. 29
"Administrative efficiency" supplies the rationale for the
Legislature's delegation of continuing authority to the President
to reorganize the Executive Branch.30 Briefly explaining this
provision as formulated in Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, the Court held in Rosa Ligaya
28. Id. at note 27, citing Sections 78 and 80 of R.A. No. 8522:
"Section 78. Organizational Changes - Unless otherwise pro-
vided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organi-
zational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency
shall be authorized in their respective organizational structure and
funded from appropriations provided by this Act.
Section 80. Scaling Down and Phase-out of Activities of Agen-
cies within the Executive Branch - The heads of departments, bu-
reaus, offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their
respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of
public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abol-
ished subject to Civil Service rules and regulations. Said activities shall
be reported to the Office of the President through the Department of
Budget and Management and to the Chairman, Committee on Appro-
priations of the House of Representatives and the Chairman, Commit-
tee on Finance of the Senate. Actual scaling down, phase-out or
abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Or-
ders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President."
29. Id. at note 27 (emphasis added).
30. Apart from the Administrative Code of 1987, Congress has enacted subse-
quent legislation that provides standards for administrative reorganizations. See Re-
public Act No. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization),
June 10, 1988.
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C. Domingo et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, et al.3 ' that "[t]he
law grants the President this power in recognition of the recur-
ring need of every President to reorganize his office 'to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency.' The Office of the President
is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective
and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of be-
ing shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies." Likewise in
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Ermita et al., the Supreme
Court characterized the Administrative Code of 1987 as a law
that "expressly grants the President the broad authority to con-
duct reorganization measures" as a matter of policy, since: "[I]n
carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is
best equipped to assess whether an executive agency ought to
continue operating in accordance with its charter or the law cre-
ating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of mak-
ing a similar assessment and appropriate action within its plenary
power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores the
need to provide the President with suitable solutions to situations
on hand to meet the exigencies of the service that may call for
the exercise of the power of control." 32
Thus, with some notable exceptions 33, the President's bare
assertion of "administrative efficiency" in carrying out adminis-
trative reorganizations in the Executive Branch (in one case 34
even extending to the merger of administrative regions) has been
generally accepted by the Philippine Supreme Court.3 5
31. Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003.
32. Anak-Mindanao Party-List Group v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166052, (S.C., Aug.
29, 2007), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/.
33. There are few landmark cases in which the Court did not rely on the bare
claim of "administrative efficiency," and found instead that administrative reorgani-
zations were done in bad faith and with grave abuse of discretion. Generally these
cases involved reorganizations undertaken in the transition from the Marcos dicta-
torship to the restoration of democratic government under the Aquino presidency.
Mendoza v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 78053, (S.C., June 4, 1990), available at http://
www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions; Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, (S.C., Aug. 8,
1989), available at http://www.lawful.net; But see Larin v. Executive Secy, G.R. No.
112745, (S.C., Oct. 16, 1997), available at http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph (which in-
volved an attempted reorganization during the administration of then President
Fidel V. Ramos).
34. Congressman James L. Chiongbian et al. v. Hon. Oscar M. Orbos, Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995 (en banc).
35. Malaria Employees and Workers Ass'n of the Phil., Inc., (MEWAP) v.
Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, (S.C., July 31, 2007), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph;
An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in
the Implementation of Government Reorganization, Rep. Act No. 6656 (June 10,
1988) (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno6656.htm; Tondo
Medical Center Employees Ass'n v. Ct. App. Phil., G.R. No. 167324, (S.C., July 17,
2007), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph; Anak-Mindanao Party-List Group v.
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It is not surprising that the incumbent President has fully
availed herself of the Court's series of broad interpretations of
the President's administrative reorganization power. Using "ad-
ministrative efficiency" in many of the preambulatory clauses in
her executive orders, the President has been able to transfer
functions from one agency to another, create new agencies, as
well as confer discretion on chosen agencies over investments,
contracts, and other specialized economic issues. 36 For example,
in November 2005, the President created an agency called the
Philippine Strategic Oil, Gas, Energy Resources and Power In-
frastructure Office (PSOGERPIO), which had the nebulous au-
thority to: 1) "certify energy projects as national priority"; 2)
"undertake agreements with private entities in accordance with
and in realization of strategic and 'national priority' projects"; 3)
"undertake project development from project conceptualization,
feasibility study, and detailed design preparation, project man-
agement and construction supervision"; and 4) "arrange and ne-
gotiate financing from public finance, bilateral and multilateral
Official Development Assistance (ODA) institutions, and from
the private sector, subject to existing procurement, accounting
and auditing rules and regulations."3 7 Energy industry players
sharply criticized the creation of PSOGERPIO as an illegal en-
Ermita, G.R. No. 166052, (S.C., Aug. 29, 2007), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
; Bagaoisan v. Nat'1 Tobacco Admin., G.R. No. 152845, (S.C., Aug. 5, 2003), availa-
ble at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/; Sec'y of the Dep't of Transp. and Commc'n v.
Mabalot, G.R. No. 138200, (S.C., February 27, 2002), available at http://
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/; EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142801-802, (S.C. July 10, 2001),
available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/.
36. See Executive Order No. 184 (Directing the Reorganization and Streamlin-
ing of the National Development Company), March 10, 2003; Executive Order No.
366 (Directing a Strategic Review of the Operations and Organizations of the Exec-
utive Branch and Providing Options and Incentives for Government Employees
who may be affected by the Rationalization of the Functions and Agencies of the
Executive Branch), October 4, 2004; Implementing Rules and Regulations of Execu-
tive Order No. 366, May 11, 2005; Executive Order No. 72 (Rationalizing the Agen-
cies Under or Attached to the Office of the President), February 11, 2002. The
President has been criticized by her own appointee, former Civil Service Commission
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, for having hired the biggest number of un-
dersecretaries, assistant secretaries, advisers, assistants, and consultants in excess of
caps set by law, and without civil service eligibility. Constantino-David has also ac-
cused the President of populating mid-level positions of bureau directors and agency
heads with more political appointees and a large number of retired soldiers and police
officers. See Isa Lorenzo and Malou Mangahas, "New CSC Chief Faces Pack of
Ineligible Bureaucrats", Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism, April 24,
2008, at http://www.pcij.org/stories/2008/ineligible-bureaucrats.htmi (last visited 10
March 2009); Isa Lorenzo and Malou Mangahas, "Malacafiang is No. 1 in excess
exec hires", Malaya, March 20, 2009, at http://www.malaya.com.ph/apr25/news6.htm
(last visited 20 March 2009).
37. Executive Order No. 474 (Creation of the Philippine Strategic Oil, Gas, En-
ergy Resources and Power Infrastructure Office (PSOGERPIO), and Defining the
Functions Thereof), Section 2, November 30, 2005. See Donnabelle L. Gatdula, "EO
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croachment of the functions of the Department of Energy, and
ultimately, as an insidious mechanism set up to favor specific in-
terests.38 The President abolished PSOGERPIO shortly after-
wards without explanation. 39
A year later, the President issued another Executive Order 40
which inexplicably transferred the Philippine Mining Develop-
ment Corporation (PMDC) from the Department of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (DENR) to the Office of the
President. Under this order, the Office of the President directly
oversaw the execution of mining contracts with foreign investors,
much to the skepticism of industry observers.41 Less than six
months later, the President issued a tersely-worded Executive
Order that transferred the PDMC back to the DENR.42
The President likewise invoked her administrative authority
to change contracting procedures in a manner that demonstrably
474 seen to drive away investors in the power sector", Philippine Star, January 27,
2006, at p. B4:
"The proposed PSOGERPIO is to '...coordinate efforts of the
Department of Energy and other departments and agencies in at-
tracting investors; and in promoting the use of indigenous and renewa-
ble energy resources and other energy resources to reduce dependence
on imported energy and reduce energy cost to the consuming public.'
But PEPOA [the Private Electric Power Operators Association]
believes the creation of such a body is illegal and not within the man-
date set by the EPIRA [Electric Power Industry Reform Act]. The
groups said this is merely a duplication of the functions of the Depart-
ment of Energy. In addition, they said the PSOGERPIO will only cre-
ate problems as it will be another layer of regulation in an industry
that is so complex and technical in nature. 'In fact, it will step on the
regulatory powers of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC)', the
PEPOA said."
38. See "Gov't may assume power firm's P43M debt: Palace", Sun Star Manila,
Dec. 19, 2005; "Mysterious energy superbody", Manila Standard, Dec. 29, 2005.
39. Federico D. Pascual, "MANILA MAIL; Lawyers try smuggling new energy
super body", Filipino Reporter, Feb. 2, 2006, at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lPl-
119635404.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2009.)
40. Executive Order No. 636 (Transferring the Philippine Mining Development
Corporation from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to the
Office of the President), July 18, 2007; Executive Order No. 665 (Conferring Cabinet
Rank Upon the Chairman of the Philippine Mining Corporation), Sept. 25, 2007. See
Michael Lim Ubac, "Mining out of DENR; now under President's office", Philip-
pine Daily Inquirer, July 27, 2007, at http.-//newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/
nation/view/2007072778988/Mining-out off DENR%3Bnow underPresident
%92s office (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
41. See Johanna Camille Sisante, "Solon: Mining contract with ZTE disadvan-
tageous to the government", Nov. 24, 2008, GMA News, http://www.gmanews.tv/
story/135289/Solon-Mining-contract-with-ZTE-disadvantageous-to-govt (last visited
10 March 2009); Carmel Crimmins, "Skepticism greets Philippine mining industry
revival", Reuters, International Herald Tribune, Apr. 3, 2008, http.//www.iht.com/
articles/2008/04/03/business/mine.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
42. Executive Order No. 689 (Transferring the Philippine Mining Development
Corporation from the Office of the President to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources), Dec. 27, 2007.
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undermines NEDA's crucial role in evaluating and recom-
mending approval of government contracts. In 2002, the Presi-
dent issued an Executive Order that permitted Department
Secretaries to forego the statutorily-required NEDA approval for
any and all government contracts not exceeding 300 million Phil-
ippine pesos (Php,)43 a value of approximately US$7 million.
Justified by the interests of "streamlining" the procedure for ap-
proval of government contracts, Department Secretaries were
given full discretion to legally determine whether contracts are
exempt from public bidding requirements, and where so exempt,
Department Secretaries could unilaterally give final approval to
the contracts.44 After this Executive Order incurred public criti-
43. Republic Act No. 7718 (An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic
Act No. 6957, entitled 'An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation
and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for other pur-
poses), May 5, 1994:
"Section 4. Priority Projects - All concerned government agen-
cies, including government-owned and -controlled corporations and
local government units, shall include in their development programs
those priority projects that may be financed, constructed, operated and
maintained by the private sector under the provisions of this Act. It
shall be the duty of all concerned government agencies to give wide
publicity to all projects eligible for financing under this Act, including
publication in national and, where applicable, international newspa-
pers of general circulation once every six (6) months and official notifi-
cation of project proponents registered with them.
The list of all such national projects must be part of the develop-
ment programs of the agencies concerned. The list of projects costing
up to Three hundred million pesos (Php300,000,000) shall be submitted
to ICC [Investment Coordinating Committee] of NEDA for its approval
and to the NEDA Board for projects costing more than Three hundred
million pesos (Php 300,000,000). The list of projects submitted to the
ICC of the NEDA Board shall be acted upon within thirty (30) working
days. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
44. Executive Order No. 109 (Streamlining the Rules and Procedures on the
Review and Approval of All Contracts of Departments, Bureaus, Offices and Agen-
cies of the Government, including Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations
and their Subsidiaries), June 7, 2002:
"SECTION 2. Exceptions to Public Bidding - The law and ap-
plicable rules and regulations provide for exceptional cases where a
Government Contract may be accepted from the requirement of pub-
lic bidding, as follows:
a. For infrastructure projects, including supply contracts, civil
works, and other related contracts, as provided under Section 62,
Chapter 13, Book IV, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 4,
Presidential Decree No. 1594, and Executive Order No. 40 dated Oc-
tober 8, 2001 [EO 40] and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
b. For procurement of goods, supplies, materials and related ser-
vices as provided under EO 40 and its Implementing Rules and Regu-
lations; and
c. For consulting services as provided under EO 40 and its Im-
plementing Rules and Regulations.
SECTION 3. Requirements for Exception from Public Bidding
- Where the Department Secretary has made a determination that a
Government Contract involving an amount of at least Three Hundred
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cism for being incompatible with the statutory requirements of
public bidding under the Government Procurement Reform
Act 4 5 the President issued an amendatory Executive Order that
reinstated the requirement of prior NEDA approval for methods
of procurement alternative to public bidding. 46 Two years later,
the President again issued another Executive Order to increase
the contract amount from 300 million Php to 500 million. Under
this Executive Order, Department Secretaries could approve and
execute contracts under alternative procurement methods. 47 By
Million Pesos (P300 Million) falls under any of the exceptions from
public bidding described in Section 2 hereof, the Department Secre-
tary shall, before proceeding with the alternative modes of procure-
ment as provided by law and applicable rules and regulations, obtain
the following:
a. An opinion from the Secretary of Justice that said Govern-
ment Contract falls within the exceptions from public bidding; and
b. Approval from the Director-General of NEDA to proceed
with a specific alternative mode of procurement under the exceptional
cases provided by law and applicable rules and regulations.
After compliance with the foregoing requirements, except for
contracts required by law to be acted upon and/or approved by the
President, Department Secretaries shall have full authority to give fi-
nal approval and/or enter into such Government Contracts excepted
from the requirement of public bidding, regardless of the amount
involved:
Where a Government Contract, not required by law to be acted
upon and/or approved by the President; involves an amount below
Three Hundred Million Pesos (P300 Million) and the concerned De-
partment Secretary has made a determination that the Government
Contract falls under any of the exceptions from public bidding de-
scribed in Section 2 hereof, the Department Secretary has full author-
ity to give final approval and/or enter into the Government Contract
without need of obtaining the foregoing requirements.
The Department Secretary may delegate in writing to appropriate
officials, subject to appropriate ceilings, this authority to determine
whether a Government Contract involving an amount below Three
Hundred Million Pesos (P300 Million) falls under any of the excep-
tions from public bidding described in Section 2 hereof."
45. Republic Act No. 9184 (An Act Providing for the Modernization, Standard-
ization and Regulation of the Procurement Activities of the Government and for
other Purposes), January 10, 2003. See "Public Says NEDA-ICC Still Needed in
BOT Project Approvals", NEDA Press Release, at http://www.iro.ph/downloads/
pressrelease/052107%20NEDA %20-%20PUBLIC%20SAYS%20NEDA-ICC%20
STILL %20NEEDED %20IN%20BOT%20PROJECT%20APPROVA LS.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2009); "Line Agencies Authorized to Approve Contracts Costing
Below Php 500-M Under Revised NEDA-ICC Guidelines", Apr. 25, 2005, http.//
www.gov.ph/news/printerfriendly.asp?i=8749 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
46. Executive Order No. 109-A (Amending Executive Order No. 109 Dated
May 27, 2002 Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Review and Approval of
All Government Contracts to Conform with Republic Act No. 9184, Otherwise
Known as the Government Procurement Reform Act), September 18, 2003.
47. Executive Order No. 423 (Repealing Executive Order No. t09-A Dated
September 18, 2003 Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Review and Ap-
proval of All Government Contracts to Conform with Republic Act No. 9184, Oth-
erwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act), April 30, 2005. The
Government Procurement Policy Board, of which NEDA is a member, passed a Res-
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the time the NBN controversy erupted in late 2007, it was clear
that there was little room for agency oversight, discretion, and
independence in foreign contracts, since by then the President
had near total control over their evaluation, approval, and
implementation. 48
NEDA's institutional independence had been compromised
by a stew of Presidentially-authorized "consultants" who con-
ducted project evaluations bypassing NEDA's own Technical
Secretariat. 49 The pattern of stark Presidential control affirms
the observation that the incumbent President "very effectively
wields the substantial powers of the presidency to keep herself in
olution in 2006 requesting the President to Amend Executive Order No. 423 to indi-
cate that prior approval (for government procurement contracts exempt from public
bidding requirements) be obtained from the Government Procurement Policy Board,
and not the NEDA. See Government Procurement Policy Board Resolution No. 06-
2006 (To Request the Amendment of Section 4 of Executive Order No. 423, Repeal-
ing Executive Order No. 109-A Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on Review
and Approval of All Government Contracts), January 20, 2006, at http.//
www.gppb.gov.ph/issuances/Resolutions/2006/06-2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2009).
48. Peter Ritter, "Crisis - Again - for the Philippines' Arroyo", TIME, Nov. 1,
2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0, 9171,1678666-
1,00.html (last visited Mar. 10 2009).
49. Alecks P. Pabico, "Can golf, realpolitik work at SSS?", MALAYA, July 18,
2008, available at http://www.malaya.com.ph//ull8/news7.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2009):
"Having consultants is not an issue, explains a senior director,
pointing out that the NEDA Secretariat has had consultants all the
time in different capacities and at different levels, especially when
projects called for it. But what is clear is that the practice had no pre-
cedent from the time of Monsod up to Canlas. Of NEDA's directors
general, it was only Neri who hired consultants specifically for his of-
fice. Monsod, who in her time saw no need for consultants as she re-
lied solely on the expertise of the staff, does agree that as an agency,
NEDA can hire consultants. But that privilege, she says, does not ex-
tend to the director general. Cielito Habito, the socioeconomic plan-
ning secretary during the administration of Fidel Ramos, says he didn't
even realize that the director general could hire that many consultants,
much more hire consultants at all. By relying on consultants like
Lozada, the NEDA staff also point out that Neri did not maximize,
and at times even bypassed, the NEDA technical secretariat which
serves as the research and technical support of the NEDA board.
During his NEDA watch, Neri allowed an unwieldy interplay of the
official and unofficial actors and processes of policy, politics and pa-
tronage. In the Senate hearings on the NBN-ZTE deal, Lozada, who
was almost like Neri's alter ego, admitted that his job as consultant
involved looking at the deal structure of proposed projects, or in
Neri's own words, 'moderating the greed' of project proponents both
from the government and private sector. This set-up, mid-level divi-
sion heads argue, had a negative effect on the usual flow of informa-
tion and decision-making critical to the institutional stability of
NEDA. 'It's hard for the NEDA Secretariat to own, defend decisions,
positions or communications that did not pass through it," they say.'
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office, and in the process she exhibits no qualms about under-
mining the country's already weak political institutions."50
The President's broad administrative authority does not
translate as easily to the case of foreign loan contracting. Wary
of the foreign loan contracting practices during the Marcos dicta-
torship which bloated the Philippines' external debt, the Consti-
tutional Commissioners were assiduous in instituting
constitutional checking mechanisms to ensure that the President
does not have the sole authority and discretion to enter into for-
eign loans. As such, bills authorizing the increase of the public
debt "shall originate exclusively in the House of Representa-
tives." 5' The President can only contract or guarantee foreign
loans after complying with requirements from the Monetary
Board and Congress. 52
Moreover, "no treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate."5 3
A new Article in the 1987 Constitution, Article XII (Na-
tional Economy and Patrimony) deliberately provides further in-
stitutional checks (from NEDA, the Legislature, the Monetary
Board, or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) on the President's
power to enter into contracts for particular economic purposes.
While the President may "enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial assis-
tance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the gen-
eral terms and conditions provided by law," the President must
also "notify Congress of every [such] contract entered into." 54
With respect to economic planning, Congress:
50. Paul D. Hutchcroft, "The Arroyo Imbroglio in the Philippines", JOURNAL
OF DEMOCRACY, Vol. 19, No. 1, Jan. 2008, pp. 141-155, at 142.
51. CONST. (1987), Art. VI, § 24.
52. See CONST. (1987), Art. VII, § 20: The President may:
[C]ontract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary
Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the
calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its deci-
sions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing
other matters as may be provided by law.
53. Id. at § 21.
54. CONsT. (1987), Art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added). But see, the broad interpre-
tation of 'technical and financial assistance agreements' in La Bugal B'laan Tribal
Ass'n v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, (S.C., January 27, 2004), available at http://
www.lawphil.net/, rev'd, G.R. No. 127882 (S.C., December 1, 2004), available at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ (emphasis added).
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[M]ay establish an independent economic and planning
agency headed by the President, which shall, after consulta-
tions with the appropriate public agencies, various private sec-
tors, and local government units, recommend to Congress, and
implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs
and policies for national development. Until the Congress
provides otherwise, the National Economic Development Au-
thority shall function as the independent planning agency of
the government.55
Apart from economic planning, the central monetary au-
thority (the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, formerly the Central
Bank of the Philippines) is made independent from the Execu-
tive Branch as a creature of Congress:
[T]he Congress shall establish an independent central
monetary authority. . .[which] shall provide policy direction in
the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have supervi-
sion over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory
powers as may be provided by law over operations of finance
companies and other institutions performing similar
functions.56
Most importantly, the Constitution stresses that "[f]oreign
loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regula-
tion of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans ob-
tained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available
to the public."57
The Legislature reflected the same concern for institutional
checks in the approval and allocation of Official Development
Assistance (ODA) loans. Under the Official Development Act
of 1996, the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA) plays a central role in ensuring that "the ODA obtained
shall be for previously identified national priority projects which
are urgent or necessary. ODA shall not be accepted or utilized
solely because of its availability, convenience, or accessibility."5 8
ODA proceeds are to be used to "achieve equitable growth and
development in all provinces through priority development
projects for the improvement of economic and social service fa-
cilities," with preference given to "rural infrastructure, country-
side development and economic zones established under the
PEZA law." 59 The Executive Department must obtain "the ex-
55. CONsT. (1987), Art. XII, § 9.
56. Id. at § 20 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at § 21 (emphasis added).
58. An Act Excluding Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the For-
eign Debt Limit in Order to Facilitate the Absorption and Optimize the Utilization
of ODA Resources, Amending for the Purpose Paragraph 1, Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 4860, as amended, Rep. Act No. 8182 § 4 (June 11, 1996) (Phil.), available at
http://www.congress.gov.ph.
59. Id.
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pressed approval of Congress . . . prior to the negotiation and
implementation of projects funded from ODA on or after 1 Janu-
ary 1995 as well as those that have not been finalized." 6 0
The equitable distribution and utilization of ODA funds by
the President expressly requires the prior recommendation of
NEDA. 61 The President must submit a request to Congress for
counterpart funds necessary to implement each ODA project, in-
cluding funds to cover cost overruns, and regularly report to
Congress on the amount of ODA loans and grants incurred.62
Oversight functions of the ODA Process are jointly discharged
by NEDA, the Constitutional Commission on Audit, and Con-
gress.63 Furthermore, the Official Development Assistance Act
entrusts NEDA with the responsibility for continuous
monitoring:
[A]ll concerned implementing and oversight agencies
shall submit to the NEDA all information and reports as may
be required by it to review draft contracts and to assess the
performance of individual ongoing projects as well as the over-
all performance of all projects which are funded in whole or in
part by ODA.64
To this end, the Legislature authorized NEDA to promul-
gate its own Implementing Rules and Regulations to realize the
Official Development Assistance Act of 1996.65 Accordingly, the
60. Id.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 5, 10.
63. Id. at § 8:
"Section 8. Oversight - Pursuant to its constitutional duties, the
Executive Department, particularly NEDA, the Commission on Audit
and Congress shall discharge Oversight functions, to wit:
(a) The NEDA shall conduct annual review of the status of all
projects financed by ODA, identify causes of delays, reasons
for bottlenecks, cost overruns, both actual and prospective,
and continued viability, and report to Congress not later than
June 30 of each year;
(b) The Commission on Audit shall conduct an audit on each
ongoing and completed project and report to Congress not
later than June 30 each year; and
(c) There shall be a Congressional Oversight Committee com-
posed of the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means
of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, five (5)
members each from the Senate and the House representing
the majority and two (2) members each from the Senate and
the House representing the minority to be designated by the
leaders of the majority and minority in their respective
chambers."
64. Id. § 9.
65. Id. at § 11. See Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for Republic
Act No. 8182, Otherwise Known as the 'Official Development Assistance (ODA)
Act of 1996', §§ 4, 7 ( July 23, 1996), available at http://pcij.org/philippineodatrail/
?p=35 (last visited Oct. 22, 2009):
"RULE 4 ICC Processing and Approval
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NEDA's Investment Coordinating Committee (NEDA-ICC) es-
tablished guidelines for review of foreign-financed projects.66
III. ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATIONS:
COMPARATIVE PRACTICES
The President's administrative power is anchored on the na-
ture of her executive power. Prior to the overthrow of the
Marcos dictatorship and the promulgation of the 1987 Constitu-
Processing of projects proposed to be financed by ODA loans or
loans and grants shall be in accordance with the Investment Coordina-
tion Committee's (ICC) (i) Guidelines and Procedures and (ii) Project
Evaluation Guidelines and Procedures. These guidelines and proce-
dures shall be updated as may be necessary to reflect the develop-
ments in government policies, procedures and methodologies
regarding investment programming and project evaluation.
SECTION 5.4. Projects with Cost Overruns - Projects with
cost overruns, regardless of cause, shall be remanded to the ICC for
reappraisal.
The reappraisal will determine the continued viability of the
projects and the reasonable levels of cost overruns that shall be the
bases for recommending additional appropriations to be included in
the annual national expenditure program to be submitted to Congress.
A quarterly report on projects with cost overruns shall be submit-
ted by the NEDA Secretariat to ICC for inclusion in the annual report
to Congress.
RULE 7 Continuous and Effective Monitoring
SECTION 7.1. Monitoring of Ongoing ODA-Assisted Projects
THE NEDA SHALL CONDUCT THE CONTINUOUS AND EFFECTIVE
MONITORING OF ALL ONGOING ODA-ASSISTED PROJECTS. For this pur-
pose, all concerned implementing agencies with ODA-assisted projects
shall submit to the NEDA Secretariat not later than four (4) weeks
after the end of every quarter, reports containing the following
information:
a. Physical targets and actual accomplishments;
b. Budget allocation, project expenditures and loan and grant
disbursements;
c. Statement of expenses submitted to funding agencies per month
during the quarter;
d. Implementation delays experienced and actions taken;
e. Recommended actions or action plan to resolve implementation
problems; and,
f. Other information which may be relevant in assessing the progress
of implementation of the project.
The implementing agencies shall also provide the abovecited in-
formation to the Project Monitoring Committees (PMCs) of the re-
gions, provinces, cities and municipalities established under E.O. 93 (s.
1993) amending E.O. 376 (s. 1989) creating the Regional Project Mon-
itoring and Evaluation System (RPMES); at the regional level, these
may be forwarded to the NEDA Regional Offices (NROs) which serve
as the secretariats of the Regional Project Monitoring Committees
(RPMCs).
The NEDA shall report to the President within six (6) weeks after
the end of each semester the overall performance of all ongoing ODA-
assisted projects."
66. See ICC Project Evaluation Guidelines, http://www.neda.gov.ph/progs-prj/
ICC/ICC-guidelines&procedures.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
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tion, the Philippines had followed a strong version of the unitary
executive model.67 During the Commonwealth period, the Phil-
ippine Supreme Court construed broad executive authority for
the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, transcending
those of the State governors of the United States. 68 The accept-
ance of broad executive power under the 1935 Constitution and
the 1973 Constitution 69 presaged the Philippine Supreme Court's
early acceptance of the President's broad administrative powers.
The Philippine Supreme Court's jurisprudence on adminis-
trative reorganization often reflects statutorily-delegated Presi-
dential powers70 to reorganize the bureaucracy for "simplicity,
67. IRENE CORTES, THE PHILIPPINE PRESIDENCY: A STUDY OF EXECUTIVE
POWER, (1966 ed., University of the Philippines College of Law).
68. See In re McCulloch Dick, G.R. No. 13862, April 16, 1918 (en banc); Lope
Severino v. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands et al., G.R. No. 6250,
August 3, 1910:
"It having become necessary in the judgment of the President of
the United States, he created, as we have been, the office of Civil Gov-
ernor (Governor-General) and vested in him the executive authority
in all civil affairs in the Government of the Philippine Islands, which
had theretofore been exercised by the Military Governor. This order
of the President was also ratified and affirmed by Congress. all the
legislative power in civil affairs was vested in the Philippine Commis-
sion, which was exercised by it until the convening of the Assembly,
and that legislative power is now exercised by the Philippine Legisla-
ture in all that part of the Philippine Islands not inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes, the Commission still retaining its legislative
power over the Moro Province and the territory inhabited by non-
Christian tribes. This government being modeled after the Federal
and State governments in the United States now possesses a complete
governmental organization, with executive, legislative, and judicial de-
partments, which are exercising functions as independent of each
other as the Federal of State governments. . . While the duties imposed
upon the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands are not as great
as those imposed upon the President of the United States, we think he
holds a more responsible position than those held by the State gover-
nors. . In most of the States there is a significant distinction between
the State and local official, such as county and city officials over whom
the governors have very little, if any, control; while in this country the
Insular and provincial executive officials are bound to the Governor-
General by strong bonds of responsibility. So we conclude that the
powers, duties, and responsibilities conferred upon the Governor-
General are far more comprehensive than those conferred upon State
governors."
69. Diane A. Desierto, "A Universalist History of the 1987 Philippine Constitu-
tion", HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL/ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL His-
TORY, Volumes 10 -11 (forthcoming 2009).
70. The reorganization statutes were passed in the process of administrative re-
form following the Philippines' achievement of independence and establishment of
democratic constitutional government. See An Act Creating the Government Sur-
vey and Reorganization Commission and Appropriating Funds Thereof, Rep. Act
No. 997 (June 9, 1954) (Phil.) available at http://www.doh.gov.ph/; See also An Act
Authorizing the President of the Philippines, With the Help of a Commission on
Reorganization, To Reorganize the Different Executive Departments, Bureaus, Of-
fices, Agencies and Instrumentalities of the Government. Including Banking or Con-
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economy, and efficiency," and the Court has not questioned the
veracity of the President's assertion of administrative effi-
ciency. 71 Instead, the Court tends to focus on the issue of bad
faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of ad-
ministrative reorganizations.
The two most frequently-cited decisions on the bad faith test
in administrative reorganizations are Larin v. Executive Secretary
and Dario v. Mison.72 Given the extraordinary facts in both of
these cases it is vital to note that the Court did not preclude the
possibility that the President could also assume a counterpart
burden of proof to show good faith in an administrative reorgani-
zation.73 Otherwise stated, both Larin and Dario support the po-
trolled by it, Subject to Certain Conditions and Limitations, Rep. Act No. 5435
(Sept. 9, 1968) (Phil.) available at http://www.chanrobles.com/republicacts/republi-
cactno5435.html. When President Ferdinand Marcos assumed executive and legisla-
tive powers during his twenty-year dictatorship rule, administrative reorganizations
were frequently authorized by mere executive order. Interestingly, President
Corazon Aquino followed a similar route after the toppling of the dictatorship dur-
ing the 1986 EDSA Revolution. While she held both executive and legislative pow-
ers under the Provisional/Freedom Constitution, President Aquino reorganized the
bureaucracy to remove the last vestiges of the Marcos regime.
71. For example, in University of Santo Tomas v. The Board of Tax Appeals, the
Court limited itself to a textual examination of the President's executive order im-
plementing Republic Act No. 422, the statute authorizing reorganization. It accepted
the assertion of administrative efficiency, but ultimately held that the President's
executive order was unlawful and ultra vires, since the executive order's terms
facially transferred the jurisdiction of courts of first instance in internal revenue
cases. Univ. of Santo Tomas v. Bd of Tax App., G.R. No. L-5701, (S.C., June 23,
1953), available at http://www.lawphil.net.
72. Larin v. Executive Sec'y, G.R. No. 112745, (S.C., Oct. 16, 1997), available at
http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph; Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, (S.C., Aug. 8, 1989),
available at http://www.lawful.net.
73. Larin involved the initial de jure, and later, de facto removal of Aquilino
Larin, then the Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). Larin, G.R. No. 112745. Following Larin's criminal con-
viction by the Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court) and pending the appeal of the con-
viction before the Philippine Supreme Court, Larin was administratively charged
before the Office of the President in relation to the facts on which the criminal
conviction was based. Id. The Office of the President held Larin administratively
liable and dismissed him from the service. Id. Subsequently, the Philippine Su-
preme Court reversed Larin's conviction, with the categorical finding that there was
"nothing illegal" whatsoever in the acts committed by Larin. Id. When Larin in-
voked the Philippine Supreme Court's reversal on those factual findings to appeal
the administrative dismissal, he discovered that the Office of the President had is-
sued an Executive Order that abolished the Excise Tax Service of the BIR. Id. The
President appointed new BIR Assistant Commissioners, but Larin was not included.
Id. The Supreme Court in Larin held that the President failed to prove good faith in
this administrative reorganization, particularly since the abolition of the Excise Tax
Service of the BIR was followed by the creation of another office that substantially
performed the same functions. Id.
On the other hand, Dario involved a more extensive factual review by the
Court. Dario, G.R. No. 81954. The administrative reorganization subject of this
case was an extraordinary one in terms of scope and purpose. Id. This reorganiza-
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sition that the Court could extend its review beyond the
President's mere assertion of "administrative efficiency" to the
(actual and prevailing) factual setting of executive conduct.
Notably, the legislative standard to determine the legitimacy
of an administrative reorganization was first tested in Francisco
L. Mendoza et al. v. Hon. Lourdes R. Quisumbing, et al.7 4 . In
Mendoza, the Court had the first occasion to apply Republic Act
No. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Ser-
vice Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Govern-
ment Reorganization). Applying the law's enumeration in Sec. 2
of various badges of bad faith reorganizations, the Court in Men-
doza treated the reclassification of offices that performed sub-
stantially the same functions as the original offices, as one such
badge.
Significantly, Mendoza included a novel judicial approach,
one that categorically denied executive officers full unilateral dis-
cretion to ensure "effective implementation" of reorganization.
This extreme use of administrative authority, according to the
Court in Mendoza, amounted to a constitutionally-repugnant
"roving commission."7 5
tion took place under then President Aquino's extraordinary executive and legisla-
tive revolutionary powers under the Provisional/Freedom Constitution. Id.
Virtually all government offices were covered by the reorganization, which was un-
dertaken not just for administrative efficiency but for the political purpose of ensur-
ing the removal of "the last vestiges of the Marcos dictatorship." Id. The Court in
Dario copiously reviewed the factual circumstances surrounding the reorganization,
and concluded that, notwithstanding the executive claim of "administrative effi-
ciency to streamline bureaucratic procedures," executive officials had been, in fact,
impermissibly given roving authority and discretion to abolish government units
(and necessarily, remove government employees) at will and without cause. Id.
74. Mendoza v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 78053, (S.C., June 4, 1990), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions (emphasis added).
75. Id. at note 73:
"There is no dispute over the power to reorganize - whether tradi-
tional, progressive, or whatever adjective is appended to it. However,
the essence of constitutional government is adherence to basic rules.
The rule of law requires that no government official should feel free to
do as he pleases using only his avowedly sincere intentions and con-
science to guide him. The fundamental standards of fairness embodied
in the bona fide rule cannot be disregarded. More particularly, the
auto-limitations imposed by the President when she proclaimed the
Provisional Constitution and issued executive orders as sole law maker
and the standards and restrictions prescribed by the present Constitu-
tion and the Congress established under it, must be obeyed. Absent
this compliance, we cannot say that a reorganization is bona-fide.
The public respondents (who are petitioners in some cases) argue
that they have followed standards. However, the standard they present
is derived from the typical grant of rule-making authority found in all
the questioned Executive Orders, to wit:
'The Minister shall issue such rules, regulations, and other issu-
ances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of
the provisions of this Executive Order.'
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However, the Mendoza approach would not be reiterated in
subsequent administrative reorganization cases, which tended to
defer to the President's bare assertion of "administrative effi-
ciency." In the administrative reorganization cases decided in
the last ten years76 the Court has displayed a belief in a strong
unitary executive through broad interpretations of the Presi-
dent's continuing authority to reorganize the Executive Branch
under her express and residual powers in the Administrative
Code of 1987.
This tendency towards reifying strong Presidential authority
in administrative law appears consistent with Paul H. Brietzke's
opinion that administrative laws in the Third World are "least
suited to democracy." Considering the influence of colonial his-
tory on postcolonial legal traditions in Third World countries,
Brietzke observes that "a style of administrative law evolved
which suited the Third World's many recurring military regimes:
rapid decrees-as orders, usually promulgated during a declared
,emergency.' These orders bear little relation to each other or to
more general goals, and they reflect a passion for extending a
personalized control."7 7
Problematically, the attitude towards centralization of gov-
ernment power perpetuates the view of Asian exceptionalism
even in presumably democratic regimes. Governance reflects
strong state corporatism that protects executive prerogatives and
discretion. This distrust for diffusing executive authority, in turn,
results in a net effect of hostility to institutionalized pluralism.
Ultimately, this governance strategy leads to an "anti-politics"
position that denies other institutions (e.g. civil society) any sub-
The alleged standard - 'ensure the effective implementation of
the provisions of this Executive Order' - is no standard. Under the
public respondents concept, their standard is a roving commission giv-
ing the executive officer unbridled discretion to do as he pleases as
long as, in his belief, his act effectively implements the executive or-
der. As earlier mentioned, the standards are found elsewhere in the
governing charters in sufficiently clear and ample language. The grant
of quasi-legislative power to implement the reorganization is bound by
these standards. Unfortunately the public officials concerned have
misread the instructions and decided to implement reorganization ac-
cording to their full discretion in a manifestly invalid manner."
76. For example, Tondo Medical Center Employees Association et al. v. The
Court of Appeals et al., Anak-Mindanao Party List Group et al. v. The Executive
Secretary et al., Drianita Bagaoisan et al. v. National Tobacco Administration et al.,
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications v. Roberto
Mabalot, Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB et al. v. Hon. Executive Secretary Ronaldo D.
Zamora et al., and Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines,
Inc. (MEWAP) et al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo et al.
Id. at note 35.
77. Paul H. Brietzke, Democratization and ... Administrative Law, 52 Okla. L.
Rev. 1, 11 (1999).
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stantial role in enforcing the broad right to public
accountability.78
Even the United States, with its admittedly stronger execu-
tive model than the Philippines, 79 has a less deferential approach
to the Presidential authority to conduct administrative reorgani-
zations80 . The American President's power to reorganize does
not exist inherently from the nature of executive power, but from
infrequent Congressional delegation.81 Reorganization was not
comprehensively legislated in the US until the Reorganization
Act of 1949, which:
[M]andated that the President periodically examine
agency structures and suggest changes in light of the following
factors: 1) promoting better execution of the laws and more
effective management of the Executive branch; 2) reducing ex-
penditures and increasing efficiency and economy; 3) consoli-
dating and coordinating agencies and functions according to
major purposes; 4) reducing the number of agencies, and abol-
ishing those which are unnecessary; and 5) eliminating overlap
and duplication between the agencies.82
The Reorganization Act of 1949 expired in 1973, was renewed in
1977, and then expired in 1981. Since 1981 "there has been no
reorganization authority in place and Congress in the future may
be unwilling to establish a statutory authority similar to past
grants."8 3 Nevertheless, it has been observed that, generally, the
U.S. President "can still carry out internal reorganizations of
agencies even without a reorganization act." 84 It remains closely
contested if the President's "internal" administrative reorganiza-
tion power extends (and if so, to what degree) to independent
regulatory commissions. 85 Independent regulatory commissions
(IRCs) are creatures of statute and do not possess constitutional
78. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Exception Becomes the Norm: Law and Re-
gimes of Exception in East Asia, 2 APLPJ 108 (2001).
79. See DIANE A. DESIERTO, FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINT: UNIVERSALISM IN
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE PARTIC-
ULARIST POWER (FORTHCOMING 2009).
80. Id. at note 14.
81. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 90-91 (5th ed. 2009). See also FRANK J. GoODNOW,
Comparative Administrative Law 66-70 (vol. 1 2005).
82. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 90, at 90-91.
83. Id. at note 80, citing the fact that Congress would likely require a legislative
veto for such authority. However, the Supreme Court decision in INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983) has made establishing such a veto virtually impossible.
84. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 80, at 91. (Citing the fact that Congress would
likely require a legislative veto for such authority). However, the Supreme Court
decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), has made establishing such a veto
virtually impossible.
85. See PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION To ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1989, Carolina Academic Press), at pp. 59-77.
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status, unlike NEDA in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The
earliest IRCs were "regarded as agents of the legislature and not
part of the executive branch," established to aid Congress in dis-
charging its interstate commerce powers.86
The result has been an uneasy relationship between the
President and IRCs.87 Some scholars strenuously argue in favor
of the position that the President has broad power to manage
and influence IRCs, which are constitutionally derived from the
doctrine of a unitary executive. 8 From this strong variant of the
unitary executive doctrine follows arguments favoring central-
ized rulemaking and executive review of agency decision-making,
which collectively promote political accountability, inter-agency
coordination, and cost-effective harmonization of agency rules.89
The converse view of IRCs defends their supposedly unique
functions and technical expertise, which warrant Congressional
insulation from Presidential control. This view depends on a re-
thinking of the traditional tripartite separation of powers
formula90 towards an understanding of how government author-
ity is diffused in the modern administrative state where special-
ized agencies appear best equipped to adapt to changing fact
situations and circumstances. 9' IRCs comprise a unique species
in American federal government precisely because of their statu-
torily-provided "independence." As observed by an American
administrative law scholar, this "independence" manifests itself
in various characteristic features of IRCs: "the bipartisan ap-
pointment requirement, the fixed term requirement, and the re-
quirement that removal be limited to express causes." 9 2 IRCs
are also organized predominantly as collegial bodies of multiple
decision-makers, reflecting shared, consensual, and pluralistic
opinions. The entrenched history of group deliberations, collec-
tive research, fact-finding, rule-making 93 and adjudication in
86. Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regu-
latory Process, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 461, 466 (1994). See also Humphrey's Ex'r v.
U.S., 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
87. Moreno, supra note 85, at 481-88.
88. Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary
Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(2004).
89. See Nicholas Bagley and Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006).
90. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001).
91. Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response
to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 291 (2001).
92. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988
DUKE L.J. 257, 259-263 (1988).
93. For an analysis of the interaction between Congressional delegation and
agency discretion in rule-making or standard-setting, see Robert J. Gregory, When a
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IRCs presumably leads towards institutionalized expertise in va-
rious spheres of government regulation. This view of the IRCs as
an emergent "Fourth Branch" of government, however, has not
gone unchallenged and continues to be the subject of legal
critique. 94
Nevertheless, what is important for purposes of this compar-
ative analysis is that it is by and large undisputed that the Presi-
dent does not have the authority to dictate regulatory decisions
entrusted to IRCs by law.95 As will be argued in more detail in
Part III, this restrictive view of the President's authority with re-
spect to IRCs' regulatory decision-making powers should find an
even more forceful translation in the Philippine setting, where
NEDA's unique and independent role in project evaluation deci-
sions of ODA-funded projects are predicated not just on statu-
tory, but also constitutional grounds. In this sense, the
constitutional and statutory delegation of authority to NEDA in
the foreign loan context is more a matter of avoiding Presidential
arbitrariness rather than pursuing the usual administrative objec-
tive of political accountability. 96
IV. DELIMITATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
IN THE ODA PROCESS
The controversy over the aborted National Broadband Net-
work (NBN) deal in 2007 is not the first time that the Philippine
President's administrative authority has been exercised at the ex-
pense of NEDA's institutional independence. Other ODA-
funded public contracts (most- of which contain suspect terms,
conditions, and warranties) have followed a similar pattern of ex-
ecutive encroachment of NEDA functions.97 That this exercise
Delegation is Not a Delegation: Using Legislative Meaning to Define Statutory Gaps,
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 725 (1990).
94. See Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State is Inconsistent
with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 491 (2008).
95. See Rovert v. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State:
the Not-so-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 963, 1011 (2001).
96. For the theoretical analysis of arbitrariness as a standard for legitimacy in the
modern administrative state, see Lisa Schulz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbi-
trariness and Legitimacy in the Modern Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461
(2003).
97. Another public contract which has almost identical project evaluation meth-
ods, as well as contract negotiation and execution features, as the NBN controversy
is the controversial North Rail project. See also Norman Bordadora, North Rail,
builder subject to RP laws, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Oct. 13, 2008, http://newsinfo.
inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20081013-166102/NorthRail-builder-sub-
ject-to-RP-laws; See also Main News Manila Bulletin, North Rail contract assailed by
UP Law professors, Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp., Sept. 30, 2005. See also Roel
R. Landingin, 7 in 10 ODA Projects Fail to Deliver Touted Benefits, Philippine Cen-
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of administrative authority has continued for years without a cer-
tiorari challenge being brought to Philippine courts says much
about the widespread acceptance of the fiction that the President
can indeed short-circuit NEDA-ICC project evaluation processes
at will, since she is the final repository of executive and adminis-
trative power.
When the President issues executive orders that: 1) assert
her authority in the ODA process to transfer project evaluations
to ad hoc bodies or committees of Presidential consultants; 2)
raise the threshold amounts exempt from NEDA-ICC project
evaluations; or 3) unilaterally alter the standards for ODA pro-
ject evaluations, her actions amount to an outright substitution of
Presidential discretion for NEDA-ICC's regulatory decisions on
ODA project approvals and allocations. Under the current trend
in Philippine jurisprudence on administrative reorganizations,
however, the President should theoretically find safe harbor from
judicial review if her executive order simply states "administra-
tive efficiency" as its purpose, pursuant to her express and
residual powers under the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, interference with the ODA process implicates
complex and interlocking constitutional as well as statutory poli-
cies. To reiterate, NEDA is constitutionally-mandated to be the
Philippines' "independent central planning agency."98 While the
President acts as Chairman of the NEDA Board Executive Com-
mittee, decision-making in NEDA (especially with respect to the
approval of ODA projects) remains a fully collegial process, with
each board member retaining the right to vote to approve Board
Resolutions. Not all NEDA Board members are members of the
Presidential staff or the official Cabinet. For example, the Gov-
ernor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, who enjoys a fixed term
and is independent from Presidential supervision and control, sits
as a board member in the NEDA Board Executive Committee. 99
When the President creates ad hoc bodies that bypass NEDA-
ICC project evaluations, therefore, she is not simply transferring
functions from one office to another. Rather, her acts deprive
NEDA of its lawful jurisdictional prerogatives. The President's
continuing authority to reorganize the Executive Branch under
tre for Investigative Journalism, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.pcij.org/stories/2008/oda9.
html.
98. CONST. (1987), Art. XII, § 9.
99. See The New Central Bank Act, Rep. Act No. 7653 §§ 1-2, 6, 17-18, (June
14, 1993) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/. See also Creating the NEDA
Board Executive Committee and Facilitating Action on Matters Requiring the Deci-
sion of the NEDA Board, Mem. 222 §§1-2 (July 26, 1994) (Phil.), available at http://
www.neda.gov.ph/.
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the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot prevail against the con-
stitutionally-expressed imperative of NEDA independence.
Apart from its constitutionally-mandated independence,
NEDA enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to undertake regulatory de-
cisions in relation to ODA approvals. The Legislature made an
exclusive express delegation of authority to NEDA under the Of-
ficial Development Assistance Act of 1996, to favorably recom-
mend the approval of ODA and the subsequent equitable
distribution and utilization of ODA funds, as well as to review
the status of all ODA-financed projects.100 Moreover, NEDA
has the exclusive responsibility to continuously monitor ODA
contracts and ODA-funded projects, as well as to formulate rules
to implement the Official Development Assistance Act of 1996.
Clearly, the Legislature intended NEDA to function as the pri-
mary institutional gatekeeper in the ODA approval and alloca-
tion process. Nowhere in the ODA Act of 1996 is the President
conferred any unilateral discretion with respect to the ODA pro-
cess. She must, in fact, obtain Congressional approval for the
negotiation and implementation of ODA-funded projects, as well
as Congressional appropriation of counterpart funds for ODA
projects and as any contingency funds to answer for potential
cost overruns. 0 1 With the ODA Act of 1996 being the later stat-
utory enactment, it must be presumed that the Legislature in-
tended to carve out the ODA process from the traditional
administrative reorganization powers of the President under the
Administrative Code of 1987. Considering that the ODA Act of
1996 explicitly recognized that ODA involves contracts "with
governments of foreign countries with whom the Philippines has
diplomatic, trade relations or bilateral agreements.. .or multilat-
eral lending institutions," 102 it would not have been extraordi-
nary if the President invoked her foreign policy powers in this
sphere of governance. And yet, Congress specifically denied the
President any exclusive discretion or authority to administer the
ODA process. The desire to insulate and counterbalance execu-
tive prerogative with NEDA as an independent institutional
checking mechanism (along with the Commission on Audit and
Congress) could certainly not be any clearer.
In this respect, NEDA could be analogized to the indepen-
dent regulatory commissions (IRCs) in the United States. Ar-
100. See An Act Excluding Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the
Foreign Debt Limit in Order to Facilitate the Absorption and Optimize the Utiliza-
tion of ODA Resources, Amending for the Purpose Paragraph 1, Section 2 of Re-
public Act No. 4860, as amended, Rep. Act No. 8182 § 4 (June 11, 1996) (Phil.),
available at http://www.congress.gov.ph/.
101. Id.
102. Id. at § 2(b).
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guably, however, NEDA occupies a larger role in the Philippine
legal system, precisely because of its constitutionally-mandated
role in economic planning and foreign loan contracting. The
United States President who enjoys vast executive and adminis-
trative powers cannot substitute his discretion for that of the
IRCs in regulatory decision-making within their spheres of com-
petence. If the American system is used as a reference point, the
Philippine President, whose executive powers were considerably
limited under the structure and design of the postcolonial and
post-dictatorship 1987 Constitution,' 0 3 would be denied leeway
in substituting her discretion for NEDA's regulatory decisions in
the ODA process. Plainly, the President's interference with
NEDA's discretion in the ODA process amounts to a classic con-
stitutional violation.
Moreover, if the facts surrounding the NBN controversy are
any indication, the President's recent policy of unilaterally exe-
cuting foreign loans without Legislative and Monetary Board ap-
provals is another instance of glaring Presidential overreaching
under the mantle of "administrative authority." The NBN con-
troversy failed to reach the Supreme Court on the merits because
the President cancelled the contract even before certiorari peti-
tions could be filed to contest the legality of the execution of the
NBN contracts. However, the executive practices exhibited were
a troubling instance of evading the institutional accountability
expressly built into the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Even prior
to the 1987 Constitution, the Legislature had already passed stat-
utes to control the President's authority to contract foreign
loans.104 During his twenty-year dictatorship, then-President
103. Id. at note 78.
104. See, e.g., An Act Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, Rep. Act No. 6142, 66:51 0.G. 11170, (Novem-
ber 9, 1970) (Phil.); An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Obtain
such Foreign Loans and Credits, or to Incur such Foreign Indebtedness, as may be
Necessary to Finance Approved Economic Development Purposes or Projects, and
to Guarantee, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, Foreign Loans obtained
or Bonds issued by Corporations owned or controlled by the Government of the
Philippines for Economic Development Purposes, including those Incurred for Pur-
poses of Re-Lending to the Private Sector, Appropriating the Necessary Funds
therefor, and for other purposes, Rep. Act No. 4860 (August 8, 1966) (Phil.), availa-
ble at http://www.lawphil.net/; An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines
to Incur, on Behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, Loans from the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and/or other Foreign or International
Financial Institutions to Finance an Expanded Program of Irrigation Development,
and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 4853, IV CPS 667 (Rev. Ed.) (July 18, 1966)
(Phil.); An Act to Authorize the President of the Philippines to Negotiate and Con-
tract with the Export and Import Bank of Tokyo, Japan, or with any other Foreign
Financial Institutions or Foreign Manufacturing Corporations or their Duly Author-
ized Agents, in the Name and on Behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, One or
Several Loans, for the Purpose of Financing a Nationwide Telecommunications Ex-
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Ferdinand Marcos exercised his vast executive and legislative
powers to remove many former statutory restrictions and safe-
guards on foreign loan contracting,105 which "legitimated"
Marcos and his cronies' reckless use of cheap credits that
plunged the Philippines into exorbitant foreign debt in the 1970s
and 1980s.
At its worst, the President's broad use of her executive
power and administrative authority in foreign loan contracting
exemplifies her wholesale indictment of the overall constitutional
and statutory oversight mechanisms in the ODA process and
other related laws. Bypassing critical institutions such as NEDA,
the Monetary Board, and the Legislature has topographical con-
sequences on accountability and public policy. To highlight ex-
actly how Presidential abuse of administrative authority
undermined the ODA process and plunged the Philippines
deeper into debt under extremely onerous conditions, Part III
concludes with a detailed case study on the illegality of executive
actions in the NBN controversy.
A. CASE STUDY: ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL
JUSTIFICATIONS IN THE NBN CONTROVERSY
To justify her unilateral execution of the contract for ser-
vices to establish the National Broadband Network (NBN) and
Cyber-Education project with China's ZTE Corporation, the
President invoked a purported "treaty" exception to the compet-
itive public bidding requirement for public infrastructure projects
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as
the Government Procurement Reform Act (RA 9184). RA 9184
defines "Infrastructure Projects" as:
the construction, improvement, rehabilitation, demolition, re-
pair, restoration or maintenance of roads and bridges, rail-
ways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, civil works
components of information technology projects, irrigation,
flood control and drainage, water supply, sanitation, sewerage
and solid waste management systems, shore protection, en-
ergy/power and electrification facilities, national buildings,
school buildings, hospital buildings and other related construc-
tion projects of the government. (Emphasis added.)
pansion and Improvement Project to be Handled by the Bureau of Telecommunica-
tions and to Guarantee the Same for and on Behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, and for other purposes, Rep. Act No. 2612, (July 20, 1959) (Phil.), avail-
able at http://www.lawphil.net/.
105. Presidential Decree No. 81 (Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrow-
ing act), December 14, 1972; Presidential Decree No. 150 (Amending Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrow-
ing Act).
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The scope and application of RA 9184 is explicitly limited
to: 1) the legislated preference, under Commonwealth Act No.
138, favoring domestic entities in the purchase of materials and
supplies for the government; and 2) the observance of any treaty,
international, or executive agreement "affecting the subject mat-
ter of this Act":
SECTION 4. Scope and Application - This Act shall
apply to the Procurement of Infrastructure Projects, Goods
and Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether
local or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of gov-
ernment, its departments, offices and agencies, including gov-
ernment-owned and/or -controlled corporations and local
government units, subject to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 138. Any treaty or international or executive agreement
affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine
government is a signatory shall be observed. (Emphasis
added.)
Commonwealth Act No. 138 (CA No. 1138) otherwise
known as "An Act to Give Native Products and Domestic Enti-
ties the Preference in the Purchase of Articles for the Govern-
ment" mandates that preference should be given to "materials
and supplies produced, made, and manufactured in the Philip-
pines"1 06 subject to specific conditions provided in CA No.
138.107
106. An Act to Give Native Products and Domestic Entities the Preference in
the Purchase of Articles for the Government, Comm. Act No. 138, § 1 (Nov. 7, 1936)
(Phil.), available at http://www.gppb.gov.ph/.
107. Id. at §§ 3, 4:
"SECTION 3. Only unmanufactured articles, materials, or sup-
plies of the growth or production of the Philippines or the United
States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, or supplies as
have been manufactured in the Philippines or in the Unites States,
substantially from articles, materials, or supplies of the growth, pro-
duction, or manufacture, as the case may be, of the Philippines or of
the United States, shall be purchased for public use and, in case of
bidding, subject to the following:
(a) When the lowest foreign bid, including customs duties, does
not exceed two pesos, the award shall be made to the lowest
domestic bidder, provided his bid is not more than one hun-
dred per centum in excess of the foreign bid;
(b) When the lowest foreign bid, including customs duties, ex-
ceeds two pesos but does not exceed twenty pesos, the award
shall be made to the lowest domestic bidder, provided his bid
is not more than fifty per centum in excess of the lowest for-
eign bid;
(c) When the lowest foreign bid, including customs duties, ex-
ceeds twenty pesos but does not exceed two hundred pesos,
the award shall be made to the lowest domestic bidder, pro-
vided his bid is not more than twenty-five per centum in ex-
cess of the lowest foreign bid;
(d) When the lowest foreign bid, including customs duties, ex-
ceeds two hundred pesos but does not exceed two thousand
pesos, the award shall be made to the lowest domestic bidder,
2009] 105
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The President's interpretation of the "treaty exception" in
Section 4 of RA 9184 suffered from several flaws. First, the ZTE
Supply Contract is not a treaty or executive agreement that falls
within the purported "exception" in Section 4 of RA 9184. The
ZTE Supply Contract is not a treaty since it was not concluded
between States. The parties to this contract are a state, the Re-
public of the Philippines, and a foreign private corporation, ZTE
Corporation. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
categorically defines a treaty as "an international agreement con-
cluded between States in written form and governed by interna-
tional law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation."10 8
Moreover, the ZTE Supply Contract does not comply with
the legal requirements for execution and entry into force of a
treaty. The ZTE Supply Contract was merely signed by DOTC
Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza and ZTE Vice President Yu
Yong. It did not comply with the constitutional requirement of
Presidential ratification, and the guidelines for negotiation and
ratification of international agreements under Executive Order
No. 459:109
It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and
the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the
treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is
primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instru-
ment and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is
usually performed by the state's authorized representative in
the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the
formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions
of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to
be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
provided his bid is not more than twenty per centum in excess
of the lowest foreign bid;
(e) When the lowest foreign bid, including customs duties, ex-
ceeds two thousand pesos, the award shall be made to the
lowest domestic bidder, provided his bid is not more than fif-
teen per centum in excess of the lowest foreign bid.
SECTION 4. Whenever several bidders shall participate in the
bidding for supplying articles, materials, and equipment for any depen-
dencies mentioned in section one of this Act for public use, public
buildings, or public works, the award shall be made to the domestic
entity making the lowest bid, provided it is not more than fifteen per
centum in excess of the lowest bid made by a bidder other than a do-
mestic entity, as the term 'domestic entity' is defined in section two of
this Act."
108. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added); See also Bayan v. Executive Sec'y, G.R. No. 138570,
(S.C. October 10, 2000), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/.
109. See Pimental Jr. v. Executive Sec'y, G.R. No. 158088, (S.C., July 6, 2005),
available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ (emphasis added).
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government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by Presi-
dent Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the
guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and
its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed
by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted
to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of For-
eign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and for-
ward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for
ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the
Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the
Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of
the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply
with the provisions of the treaty to render it effective. Section
7 of Executive Order No. 459 reads:
Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force
of a Treaty or an Executive Agreement. - The domestic
requirements for the entry into force of a treaty or an ex-
ecutive agreement, or any amendment thereto, shall be as
follows:
A. Executive Agreements.
i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the
Department of Foreign Affairs after their signing for the
preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal
shall include the highlights of the agreements and the
benefits which will accrue to the Philippines arising from
them.
ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the
endorsement by the concerned agency, shall transmit the
agreements to the President of the Philippines for his ratifi-
cation. The original signed instrument of ratification shall
then be returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs for
appropriate action.
B. Treaties.
i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall com-
ply with the requirements provided in sub-paragraph[s] 1
and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In
addition, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit
the treaties to the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence
in the ratification by the President. A certified true copy
of the treaties, in such numbers as may be required by the
Senate, together with a certified true copy of the ratifica-
tion instrument, shall accompany the submission of the
treaties to the Senate.
ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the
Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the pro-
vision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force.' 10
It has not been shown that the ZTE Supply Contract had
been transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs for the
preparation of ratification papers pursuant to the above guide-
110. Id.
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lines, much less that the President actually ratified the ZTE Sup-
ply Contract. Notably, the President herself subsequently
revoked the ZTE Supply Contract following publicized allega-
tions of its defects. 11
Likewise, the ZTE Supply Contract cannot be deemed an
executive agreement. An executive agreement still contemplates
an inter-governmental agreement subject to Presidential ratifica-
tion. In Abaya et al. v. Ebdane et al. the Philippine Supreme
Court included an exchange of notes as a form of executive
agreement. 112 However, in its discussion in the case, the Court
repeatedly stressed that the exchange of notes must transpire be-
tween foreign governments, and not private corporations acting
with foreign governments. 113
In Abaya, the Philippine Government and the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation (JBIC) concluded a Loan Agree-
111. "Arroyo suspends controversial broadband deal", Sun Star Network Online,
Sept. 23, 2007, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/net/2007109/23/arroyo.suspends.con-
troversial.broadband.deal.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
112. Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, (S.C., Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ (emphasis added).
113. See Bayan v. Executive Sec'y, G.R. No. 138570, (S.C. October 10, 2000),
available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/:
"Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties
and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states con-
cerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers. International law continues to make no distinction be-
tween treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding ob-
ligations upon nations.
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of exec-
utive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Con-
gress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we had
occasion to pronounce:
[T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our his-
tory we have entered into executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-na-
tion rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection,
postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agree-
ments entered into without Senate approval. (39 Columbia Law
Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export
Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.5. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796;
Ozanic vs. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15 pp. 1905-
1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on Inter-
national Law [Revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; Wil-
loughby on the U.S. Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540;
Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hack-
worth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Emphasis
Supplied).
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ment. The Philippine Supreme Court concluded that the Loan
Agreement is an "integral part of the Exchange of Notes" which
may be deemed an "executive agreement," considering that JBIC
is an "adjunct of the Japanese government."
The same cannot be said of the ZTE Supply Contract.
There is no showing that ZTE Corporation is an "adjunct" of the
Chinese government, or that there has been any "Exchange of
Notes" on record between the Philippine government and the
Chinese government for which the ZTE Supply Contract is
"integral."
Finally, an "executive agreement" is concluded by the Presi-
dent and becomes binding without need of any vote by the Legis-
lature. The mere signature of DOTC Secretary Leandro
Mendoza, however, does not bind the Republic of the Philip-
pines to the contract. The absence of Presidential ratification
militates against the characterization of the ZTE Supply Con-
tract as an "executive agreement." While DOTC Secretary Le-
andro Mendoza is admittedly an alter-ego of the President, his
mere signature does not constitute the act of ratification required
for treaties and executive agreements. Ratification is "the formal
act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a
treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be
an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government."I14 There being no actual "conclusion by the Presi-
dent" through ratification, such contract cannot have binding ef-
fect on the Philippine government. There cannot be any
international obligation created where "negotiating functionaries
[have not] remained within their powers."115
Moreover, even if the ZTE Supply Contract were to be re-
garded as a "treaty" or "executive agreement," it cannot be "ob-
served" as an exception to the requirement of competitive public
bidding. Section 4 of R.A. 9184 does not contemplate the delib-
erate execution of a treaty or executive agreement in order to
summarily remove the requirement of competitive public bid-
ding. All that the qualifying clause in Section 4 of R.A. 9184
states is: "Any treaty or international or executive agreement af-
fecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine gov-
ernment is a signatory shall be observed." The question,
therefore, is whether "observance" with such "treaty", "interna-
tional or executive agreement" affecting the subject matter of
R.A. 9184 would permit the deliberate execution of a treaty that
114. Id (emphasis added).
115. Id. See generally, Vagts et al., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMs 597-
606 (3rd ed. 2003).
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summarily dispenses with the requirement of competitive public
bidding.
It does not appear that the qualifying clause intended such
execution of a treaty to circumvent existing Philippine laws. In
Abaya, the Supreme Court cited the portions of the legislative
record referring to the qualifying clause of Section 4 of R.A.
9184. The cited portions reflect the legislators' concern that for-
eign contracts comply with Philippine laws and international
agreements. 116 It appears from the deliberations of the Bicam-
eral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provision of Sen-
ate Bill No. 2248 and House Bill No. 4809 (which formed the
basis for R.A. 9184) that the foreign contracts are deemed to
have been "brought within the ambit of Philippine law," "subject
to any treaty," and to assure that the Philippines will honor ex-
isting international obligations. It does not appear that the intent
behind the qualifying clause in Section 4 of R.A. 9184 is to per-
mit the deliberate execution of a treaty or executive agreement
that is not within the ambit of Philippine law.
Significantly, it appears that the Philippine Government has
interpreted the qualifying clause in Section 4 of R.A. 9184 in
favor of the foreign supplier's participation in competitive public
bidding "where provided for under any treaty or international
agreement." This interpretation is consistent with the legislative
intent to ensure that foreign contracts are "observed" since they
are "brought within the ambit of Philippine law" which mandates
competitive public bidding. The Government Procurement Pol-
icy Board (GPPB) itself set guidelines to determine the eligibility
of foreign suppliers for competitive public bidding for infrastruc-
ture projects.117
The GPPB's administrative guidelines (issued in relation to
R.A. 9184 in conjunction with its Implementing Rules and Regu-
lations,) should be given considerable persuasive weight as they
were issued by the same agency tasked to implement R.A.
9184.118 Taken alongside the legislative intent for the qualifying
clause of Section 4 of R.A. 9184, it does not appear that Philip-
pine law contemplates the execution of treaties, executive or in-
ternational agreements in order to circumvent the requirement
116. Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, (S.C. February 14, 2007) (Emphasis ad-
ded), available at http://lawphil.net.
117. Approving and Adopting the Guidelines in the Determination of Eligibility
of Foreign Suppliers, Contractors and Consultants to Participate in Government
Procurement Projects, Laws & Res No. 018-2005, (Sept. 12, 2005) (Phil.), available at
http://www.gppb.gov.ph/cgi-bin/issuances/files/Resolution%20No.%2018-2005.pdfh
(emphasis added).
118. See Pest Mgmt Ass'n of the Phil. (PMAP) v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Auth.,
G.R. No. 156041, (S.C., Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/.
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of competitive public bidding. As such, DOTC Secretary Men-
doza's signing of the ZTE Supply Contract with ZTE Vice Presi-
dent Yu Yong in April 2007, (already tainted with constitutional
infirmity due to the lack of prior Monetary Board approval for
incurring foreign debt and the lack of Senate advice and concur-
rence required for a "treaty" or "international agreement,"1 19)
cannot be condoned as a deliberate execution of a treaty or exec-
utive agreement that is "not within the ambit of Philippine law."
To do so would violate the plain legislative intent behind the
qualifying clause in Section 4 of R.A. 9184.
Finally, the Philippine government cannot invoke R.A. 9184
and the constitutional provisions requiring prior Monetary Board
concurrence for incurring foreign debt as well as Senate advice
and concurrence to treaties and international agreements as rules
of its "internal law of fundamental importance"1 2 0 that would
justify the invalidation of the ZTE Supply Contract. As seen
from the Supreme Court's discussion in Abaya of the history of
Philippine procurement laws, there is a strong and consistent
trend of legislative reiteration of the requirement for competitive
public bidding for government procurement. This reinforces the
clear legislative policy to mandate competitive public bidding.
More crucially, even as a "treaty" or "executive agreement,"
the ZTE Supply Contract cannot circumvent mandatory constitu-
tional requirements. Contrary to the below stipulation in the
ZTE Supply Contract, the Philippine government cannot warrant
that there will be "no contravention" of any applicable "treaty,
law, regulation."
Clause 40.1.4 of the ZTE Supply Contract states:
40.1.4. No Contravention. The execution, delivery and per-
formance of this Contract by the Purchaser do not and will not
contravene, violate, or constitute a default under (a) any pro-
visions of any agreements or other instruments to which the
Purchaser is a party or by which the Purchaser or any of its
assets is or may be bound; or (b) any treaty, law, regulation,
judgment, or order applicable to the Purchaser.
119. See CONST. (1987), Art. VI, § 29(1); CONST. (1987), Art. VII, § 20-21.
120. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331:
"Article 46. Provisions of internal law regarding competence to con-
clude treaties.
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a
treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal
law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its
consent UNLESS THAT VIOLATION WAS MANIFEST AND CONCERNED
A RULE OF ITS INTERNAL LAW OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any
State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal
practice and in good faith."
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The Philippine government cannot make the foregoing war-
ranty because the ZTE Supply Contract violates the fundamental
constitutional requirements of prior concurrence by the Mone-
tary Board before incurring foreign debt and Senate advice and
concurrence on any treaty or international agreement. Even as a
"treaty" or "executive agreement," the ZTE Supply Contract
cannot circumvent mandatory constitutional requirements. As
the Philippine Supreme Court stated in Government of the
United States vs. Purganan, "[t]reaty laws, particularly those
which are self-executing, have equal stature as national statutes
and, like all other municipal laws, are subject to the parameters set
forth in the constitution."1 2 1
Moreover, even assuming that the ZTE Supply Contract is
indeed a "treaty" or "executive agreement," as provided in R.A.
9184 it cannot supersede municipal law. Where there is a conflict
between treaty law and municipal law that is "irreconcilable," the
Supreme Court upholds municipal law "for the reason that such
courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by
it in all circumstances." 1 2 2
The constitutional requirements of prior Monetary Board
approval for incurring foreign debt (presumably under the Loan
Agreement supporting the ZTE Supply Contract) and Senate ad-
vice and concurrence on every treaty and international agree-
ment cannot be bargained away by the executive through treaty-
making. While generally accepted principles of international law
form part of the law of the land under the Incorporation Clause
of the constitution, 123 treaty provisions cannot prevail against the
strictures of the constitution.
Neither can the ambiguity of the material provisions in the
ZTE Supply Contract be used to circumvent mandatory constitu-
tional and legal requirements. Several ambiguous provisions in
the ZTE Supply Contract would presumably perpetuate the cir-
cumvention of constitutional and legal requirements:
Article 4: Technical Specifications
Equipment supplied under the Contract shall conform to the
standards in Attachment B (Technical Specification) and when
no applicable standard is mentioned, to the authoritative stan-
dard appropriate to the Equipment's country of origin, such
standards being the latest issued by the concerned institution.
This provision dilutes the Legislature's authority to properly
review appropriations for disbursements for repayment of public
121. Gov't of the U.S. v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, (S.C., Sept. 24, 2002), avail-
able at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ (Vitug, J., dissenting).
122. Sec'y of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, (S.C., Jan. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.lawphil.net (emphasis added).
123. See CONST. (1987), Art. II, § 2.
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debt (from the Loan Agreement.)124 Under this provision, the
default standard to which equipment should conform is exclu-
sively the standards issued by the Chinese government. This pro-
vision does not allow for reference to internationally accepted
standards for comparable equipment.
Article 7 (Price of the Contract) is similarly suspect, as it is
unqualified. It does not provide for any revision in the treatment
of the contract price in the event that there is any revision of the
Priced Bill of Quantities. The Philippine government would be
bound to a fixed contract price for the nearly 20-year term of the
contract, and without the opportunity to revise the price if there
is delayed delivery or non-conformity of goods and services.
Clauses 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1, and 5.1 commonly stipulate a fif-
teen percent advance payment of the price (whether for equip-
ment, engineering services, managed services, or training) upon
the effectivity of the "Loan Agreement between the Export-Im-
port Bank of China and the Department of Finance of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of the Philippines." However, these
advance payments constitute public funds, the disbursement of
which must be approved by Congress.12 5 The funds cannot be
automatically released by mere assertion of contractual right
under the ZTE Supply Contract. Moreover, it should be stressed
that the Loan Agreement referred to in these provisions will still
require prior Monetary Board approval, 126 and two-thirds Senate
concurrence.127 Clause 8.8 also has troubling aspects:
Clause 8.8: Approval of Terms of Payment
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the terms of payment set out
in this Article 8 shall be subject to the provisions of the Loan
Agreement. The Purchaser and the Contractor agree to make
relevant any changes or amendments to such terms of pay-
ment as required by the Loan Agreement.
This provision runs counter to constitutional requirements
for legislative approval for increasing public debt, obtaining prior
Monetary Board approval for contracting foreign loans, and the
Senate's power to concur with international agreements. Effec-
tively, this clause renders the contract price and payment terms
indeterminate since the Loan Agreement with the Export-Im-
port Bank of China controls the interpretation of terms of pay-
ment. This "executive agreement" (through the Loan
Agreement) ultimately dilutes, if not removes altogether, the
constitutional checks and balances to Presidential power to con-
tract foreign loans.
124. See CONsT. (1987), Art. VI, § 24-25.
125. Id.
126. See CONST. (1987), Art. VII, § 20.
127. Id. at § 21; CONST. (1987), Art. VI, § 24.
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Clause 25.4: Change Orders
25.4. Change Orders
25.4.1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
this Contract, before either Party acts on a prelimi-
nary Change Order, the Parties shall execute a writ-
ten Change Order (which may be the preliminary
Change Order signed by both Parties) incorporating
the changes in question and providing for any change
in the Implementation Schedule, any increase or reduc-
tion of the Contract Price, any change in the Work, or
other provisions of this Contract.
25.4.2. A Party's signature on the Change Order shall indi-
cate such Party's full, final, and unconditional agree-
ment with the matters prescribed in such Change
Order. (Emphasis added)
This provision innocuously gives advance and unqualified
authority to DOTC and ZTE Corporation to rewrite the contract
terms without legislative approval. It should be stressed that the
ZTE Supply Contract already transgresses the constitutional re-
quirements for prior Monetary Board approval of incurring for-
eign debt, Senate concurrence on international agreements, and
legislative approval of appropriations for disbursement of public
funds to pay for such debts. Even worse, this provision would
give unbridled authority to DOTC and ZTE Corporation to
change material provisions of the contract without any recourse
to constitutional checks and balances. Under this provision, par-
ties can simply execute a change order providing for an increase
in the contract price, change in the work, and any other provision
of the contract.
Clause 32.4: Effect of Termination
32.4. Effect of Termination
In the event of termination of the Contract under this Article
32 (Termination for Cause):
a) payment and indemnification obligations arising prior to ter-
mination will remain in force; and
b) neither Party will be liable for damages of any kind as a
result of exercising its right to terminate this Contract
under this Article and termination will not affect any other
right or remedy of either Party arising from any antecedent
breach of this Contract.
Assuming that ZTE Corporation commits a material breach
of this contract (defined only as inaccuracy of "representations
and warranties" under Clause 40.3) pursuant to Article 32 of the
ZTE Supply Contract, and DOTC subsequently terminates the
contract for cause, the Philippine government would still be lia-
ble for all of its payment and indemnification obligations under
the ZTE Supply Contract. This violates generally accepted prin-
ciples of international contract law such as good faith and fair
dealing and the doctrine of imprevision or changed circum-
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stances 28 as well as the fundamental principles of mutuality of
contracts, reciprocal obligations, and prohibition against unjust
enrichment under the Philippine Civil Code.129
Article 33.6: Waiver of immunity
33.6. The Parties irrevocably and unconditionally waives, any
immunity to which it may at any time be or become entitled,
whether characterized as sovereign immunity or otherwise,
from any suit, judgment, service of process upon it, execution
on judgment or set-off to which it may be entitled in any legal
action or proceedings with respect to this Contract or any of
the transactions contemplated hereby or hereunder.
This provision only creates a waiver of sovereign immunity
for the Republic of the Philippines. It does not provide for a
similar waiver by the People's Republic of China (PRC), which is
not a party to the ZTE Supply Contract. This will prevent the
Philippine government from instituting any proceedings to assert
a claim against the PRC for any cause of action arising under the
ZTE Supply Contract. Therefore, this provision also subverts
the principle of reciprocity in international legal obligations. 30
Clause 38: Retention of Title
38.1. Property in the Equipments.
38.1.1. Notwithstanding delivery and the passing of risk in
the Equipments, or any other provision of this con-
128. See UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 1.7:
"Article 1.7 (Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing
in international trade.
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty."
See also Bishop, R. Doak, Crawford, James, and Reisman, Michael. FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT DISPUTES: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2005 ed.), 314-16.
129. CIVIL CODE, arts. 19 in relation to 21, 1191, and 1306.
130. See Republic of Indonesia et al. v. Vinzon et al., G.R. No. 154705, June 26,
2003 (en banc):
"International law is founded largely upon the principles of reci-
procity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its
consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano 1I, the
practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that
there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is de-
rived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as ex-
pressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A
contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
See also MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999), at 89; Bruno
Simma, Reciprocity, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Rudolf
Bernhardt, ed.), Vol. IV, 2000; Francisco Parisi and Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciproc-
ity in International Law, 36 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 93 (2003).
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tract, the property in and legal title to the Equipments
shall not pass to the Purchaser until the Contractor has
received the Contract Price in full.
38.1.2. In the event that the Purchaser does not pay the
amount due, the agents of the Contractor may, until
full payment is effected, take the equipment out of
service, repossess and remove such equipment after
thirty (30) days from receipt of a formal written no-
tice by the Purchaser.
(Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that under the ZTE Supply Contract, the
Philippine government is obliged to make payments upon deliv-
ery of the equipment or rendition of services. However, the Phil-
ippines will not acquire any legal title over the equipment until
all the components of the contract price (including managed ser-
vices, engineering services and training) have been paid in full.
This prevents the Philippines from exercising any ownership
rights over the equipment (such as taking out securities using the
equipment as collateral) until the complete payment of the con-
tract price. In the meantime, the Philippines will bear the risk of
deterioration or damage during its possession of the equipment
despite the Philippines' lack of legal title, per Clauses 28 and 31
of the ZTE Supply Contract.
Clearly, the ZTE Supply Contract inequitably creates bind-
ing and protracted international obligations for the Philippine
government without creating corresponding reciprocal obliga-
tions on the People's Republic of China. The ZTE Supply Con-
tract's execution and implementation appears to bypass
constitutional requirements, and the situation created by the con-
tract is highly one-sided and deleterious to Philippine interests.
The contractual defects also render it difficult for the Philippine
government to have recourse against the PRC in the event of
ZTE's non-performance of its obligations under the ZTE Supply
Contract. These drafting and content defects could have been
timely detected and vetoed long before the execution of the con-
tract, had the President not bypassed the required ODA auditing
and monitoring processes on the basis of her broad interpreta-
tion of administrative authority.
V. CONCLUSION
In 2007, foreign business investors called the Philippines
"the most corrupt country in the Asian region."13 1 A summary
of the 2008 World Bank report on corruption cases in the Philip-
131. Carlos H. Conde, Philippines Most Corrupt, Survey Says, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2OO7/O3/I3/
business/peso.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
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pines ("Accelerating Inclusive Growth and Deepening Fiscal Sta-
bility") highlights the need for legal reforms on public
procurement and oversight on foreign contracts. Among the re-
forms suggested are the abolition of poorly controlled discretion-
ary special purpose funds; reforming the civil service system to
avoid political patronage and low compensation; and improving
criminal prosecution of tax evaders and corrupt public
officials. 132
This article attempts to contribute to the reform efforts in
Philippine governance by lifting the veil of Presidential adminis-
trative authority in the ODA process. As this paper has shown,
the structure and text of the 1987 Constitution and other relevant
laws passed by the Philippine Legislature created critical gate-
keeping institutions over the ODA process, such as the National
Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the Monetary
Board, and the Legislature. Yet the mere assertion of "adminis-
trative efficiency" has proved sufficient for the President to effect
administrative reorganizations that thwart NEDA's crucial role
in the ODA process. Presidential administrative interpretation
of the exception under the Government Procurement Reform
Act has been abused to circumvent the requirement of open and
competitive public bidding. Considering the massive encroach-
ments upon constitutional competencies, the fictive defense of
"administrative efficiency" cannot be accepted. Under the
postcolonial and post-dictatorship 1987 Constitution, which pur-
posely differentiated the bases of administrative oversight power
among numerous "independent" institutions and agencies, there
is no such thing as a "Presidential wherewithal" to arbitrarily re-
organize the Executive Branch's offices and procedures at the
expense of public accountability.
132. Doris Dumlao, World Bank lists sources of corruption in the Philippines,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 1, 2008, available at http://business.inquirer.net/
money/breakingnews/view/20080401-127574/World-Bank-lists-sources-of-corruption-
in-Philippines (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
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